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INTRODUCTION

Consider the unusual legal structures of the following four deals:
When Google went public in

2004,

it used an Internet auction to sell its

stock to shareholders.
When Ben & Jerry's went public in

1984,

it sold its stock only to Ver

mont residents.
Steve Jobs's contract with Apple entitles him to an annual cash salary of
exactly one dollar.
Stanley Works, a Connecticut toolmaker, considered reincorporating in
Bermuda to reduce its tax liability. Under public pressure, it changed its
mind and remains legally incorporated in Connecticut.

What do these deals have in common? In each case, the legal infrastruc
ture of the deal had a branding effect: the design of the deal altered the
brand image of the company.
The structure of each of the first three deals is difficult to understand us
ing the traditional tools of corporate finance alone. The deals appear to be
1
inefficient, at least if one thinks about efficiency in the usual way. But if
one also considers the impact of the deal on brand image, the Google, Ben
& Jerry's, and Apple deals are success stories. The Stanley Works deal was a
failure. But it did not fail because of some flaw in its financial design, such
as a miscalculation of the tax savings or difficulty in communicating the tax
benefits to its shareholders. The deal failed because its managers failed to
predict the negative impact that its legal infrastructure would have on its
brand image.
The concept of branding rarely appears in academic debates about cor
porate finance and corporate governance. Finance scholars focus their
attention on the relationship between the firm; its investors and creditors,

1.
Deal structures with positive branding effects may appear to be inefficient in the short
term (for example, by increasing the cost of capital). But these structures can be efficient in the long
run by increasing revenue from product markets. In theory, if the capital markets recognize the
positive revenue implications, there may not in fact be an increase in the cost of capital. This would
make the deals efficient in both the short term and the long term. Evidence from the case studies
below, however, suggests that the capital markets are slow to recognize the branding implications of
deal structures. The stock price of Google and Ben & Jerry's rose steadily following their unusual
IPOs, suggesting at least the possibility that the capital markets undervalued the branding effects of
the deals. The stock price of Stanley Works jumped at the announcement of its proposed inversion,
notwithstanding the negative branding implications that ultimately helped sink the deal.
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2
who supply financial capital; and its managers, who supply human capital.
Contracts are efficient \,\'hen they properly align incentives; a good contract
design is one that allows managers to raise capital cheaply and deploy it
effectively. At best, consumers enter the discussion as the emotionless buy
ers who make up the product markets and serve as a potential indirect check
3
agamst agency costs.
The functionality-oriented consumer. The implicit assumption in these
debates is that consumers have no rational reason to care about the internal
corporate governance of a firm whose products they buy. Most consumers,
after all, have only the haziest notion of how firms interact with the capital
markets and labor markets. Finance scholars, then, act like the editors of
Consumer Reports. They assume that consumers only value basic product
attributes like price, durability, resale value, and quality. Contract design,
after all, would seem to have little effect on the absorbency of a paper towel,
the sound quality of an mp3 player, or the creaminess of a pint of frozen
yogurt. From this perspective, the best managerial structure is whatever
structure produces the best products while keeping production costs and
transaction costs low. Corporate governance is a matter for shareholders and
managers and creditors to work out amongst themselves. By focusing on the
functionality of products, however, we mask any link between products and
contract design.
The brand-oriented consumer. Focusing only on functionality is, of
course, problematic. Consumers choose brands, not just product attributes.
Buying a pint of Ben & Jerry's is not the same experience as buying a pint
of Haagen-Dazs, even if the product is similar. Brand image reflects the val
ues of the people who create the product. In certain circumstances, I argue
here, contract design contributes to the atmospherics of the brand. An inno
vative deal structure may cost the company something in short-term
efficiency, but it may pay dividends in the form of increased demand from
consumers in the long run. Deal structure, then, is not just a method of man
aging transaction costs. It is also an advertising medium. Unlike direct
marketing tactics, however, the process is more subtle. Whatever its content,
the "message" of the deal structure reaches consumers indirectly through
early adopters or other opinion leaders-knowledgeable, sophisticated con
sumers who experiment with new products and are particularly sensitive to
the trustworthiness of the manufacturer. Just the sort of consumer, in other
words, who might pay attention to deal structure.
This Article explores the branding effect of deal structures by looking at
four case studies. First, I examine two initial public offerings (IPOs), the
•

2. See generally RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART c. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
FINANCE (7th ed. 2003); RONALD J. GILSON & B ERNARD S. BLACK, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF
CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS (2d ed. 1 995).
3. If management shirks or lacks the talent to lead the company effectively, the firm will
produce lower quality products, and customers will tum to competitors. In tum, this may tum the
company into a takeover target or may lead shareholders to press the board to make a change in
personnel. See D. Gordon Smith, Corporate Governance and Manag erial Incompetence: Lessons
from Kmart, 14 N.C. L. REv. 1037 ( 1 996).
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first by Google; the second by Ben & Jerry's. From a traditional corporate
finance perspective, the goal of a properly structured IPO is to manage the
information asymmetry between the issuer and potential buyers in order to
raise the largest amount of money possible per share of stock sold. From
this perspective, the success of the Google deal is questionable. Few would
call this deal elegant or efficient . 4 But this is not really what the Google IPO
structure was about, or at least it is not the full story. When Google struc
tured its IPO as an auction, it reinforced Google's identity as an innovative,
egalitarian, playful, trustworthy company. Talking about Google's IPO
makes you want to use Google's products.
Similarly, the Ben & Jerry's deal structure may not have been terribly ef
ficient. By selling its stock only to Vermont residents, the company saved a
few thousand dollars in legal and accounting fees. On the other hand, the
geographic restriction artificially limited demand for the stock, which may
have pushed the price down. Was the tradeoff worth it? Without considering
consumers, the cost-benefit analysis fails to capture the essence of the deal.
The offering was not just about selling stock and raising capital. It was also
about selling ice cream. Selling stock to Vermonters helped build the brand
image of the company.
The next case study looks at Apple and its contract with its CEO, Steve
Jobs. Jobs takes a salary of one dollar a year. He also owns a substantial
amount of Apple stock. Executive-compensation contracts typically provide
a mix of cash and equity designed to align the executive's incentives with
those of the company's investors. 5 But I argue here that Jobs's salary isn't
designed to provide an efficient mix of cash and equity. His contract is a
symbolic statement indicating that he's not in it for the money. "One Dollar"
feeds the cult of the Mac.
The last case study looks at Stanley Works, a Connecticut toolmaker. In
2002 Stanley Works considered reincorporating in the tax haven of Ber
muda. Conventional wisdom holds that there is no patriotic duty to pay
more in taxes than one is legally required to pay. 6 Stanley Works was within
its rights, legally speaking, to reincorporate in Bermuda. One would expect
a well-advised corporation managed by rational profit-maximizing agents to
do so. But Stanley Works' reincorporation, or rather its failure to close the
deal, was not ultimately about taxes. It was about selling hammers and
screwdrivers in the heartland. Corporate expatriation won't play in Peoria.7
What can we learn from these case studies? Innovative deal structures
allow us to peer through the gossamer corporate veil and spy the values of
4.

See infra text accompanying notes 59--66.

5.

See Michael C. Jensen, Kevin J. Murphy & Eric G. Wruck, Remuneration: Where We 'v e
Been, How We Got to Here, What Are the Pro blems, and How to Fix Them (Eur. Corp. Governance
Inst., Working Paper No. 44/2004, 2004), av ailable at http://ssrn.com/abstract=561 305.

6.

See Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 8 1 0 (2d Cir. 1 934).

7. "Will it play in Peoria?", a phrase that originated during Peoria's successful vaudeville
days, has become a commonly used metaphor for measuring whether something will appeal to the
mainstream American public. See Jennifer S. Everett, Will it Play in Peoria,
http://www.historicpeoria.com/select.cfm?chose=23 1 (last visited Feb. 10, 2006).
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the company's founders and managers. Like the Emperor penguins stoically
waddling in single file to their breeding ground,8 unusual deal structures
anthropomorphize the firm in the eyes of consumers. Innovative deal struc
tures are striking, and they can marginally affect the set of mental
associations that make up brand image. Google is not just a network of con
9
nected contracts; it is playful and innovative. Ben & Jerry's isn't just a
manufacturer of a dessert product; it's a loyal companion.
Deal structure, then, is a specialized kind of advertising medium, and it
fits some firms better than others. Reputation and brand image are espe
cially important for firms that produce expensive credence goods like
'°
Consum

medical treatment, financial advice, or an Ivy League education.

ers, skeptical of self-serving claims, tum to sources of information in
addition to traditional advertising, such as newspaper articles, U.S. News
Rankings, 11 word-of-mouth, product reviews on Amazon.com, or biogs.
Deal structure provides these opinion leaders with another source of infor
mation. Deal structure, then, is more likely to prove effective as an
advertising medium for companies that rely heavily on opinion leaders to
drive demand, such as consumer-technology companies or manufacturers of
trendy consumer goods and cult brands. These companies seek consumers
who highly value attributes like innovation, creativity, coolness, or altruism,
and not just functionality. For these companies, the legal infrastructure of
deals provides early adopters with a window through which they can view,
or imagine, the soul of the company.
*

*

*

Roadmap and clarification of terms. Following this introduction, I have
organized this Article into three main sections. In Section II below, I briefly
review the literature on the lawyer's role in structuring deals. Many would
consider branding a "business issue" of little concern to lawyers; Section II
explains why responsible lawyers should consider the institutional and so
cial context in which deals are done. The case studies in Section III explore
in some detail how the legal infrastructure of deals can have a branding ef
fect. In Section

IV, I conceptualize the role of branding as it relates to deal

structure. Certain legal events in the lifecycle of the company-what I call

branding moments-provide opportunities for firms to signal company val
ues. I also consider the mechanisms by which knowledge of innovative
structures spreads to consumers, which in tum provides some insight into

8.

See LA MARCHE DE L'EMPEREUR [MARCH OF THE PENGUINS] (Bonne Pioche 2005).

See G. Mitu Gulati, William A. Klein & Eric M. Zolt, Connected Contracts, 47 UCLA L.
REV. 887 (2000).
9.

10. Credence goods are items for which the quality cannot be easily assessed even after the
purchase has been made, such as financial advice or auto repair. See Michael R. Darby & Edi Kami,
Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of Fraud, 1 6 J.L. & EcoN. 67 (1973).
11. See Bernard S. Black & Paul L. Caron, Ranking Law Schools: Using SSRN to Measure
Scholarly Pelformance, 8 1 IND. L.J. 1 (2006); Posting of Victor Fleischer to Conglomerate,

http://www.theconglomerate.org/2005/08/branding_legal_.html (Aug. 1 2, 2005).
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what companies might be best suited to take advantage of the branding ef
fects of corporate deal structuring.
Before proceeding further, it may be useful to clarify what I mean by
"deals" or the "legal infrastructure of deals." It may seem obvious that deal
makers think about brand image. When Canon hires Maria Sharapova or
Andre Agassi as a spokesperson, the deal has a branding effect. But my fo
cus here is not on the branding implications of run-of-the-mill advertising
transactions. This Article focuses instead on the sorts of deals for which a
firm might engage outside legal counsel. These deals include IPOs, mergers
and acquisitions, securities offerings, executive-compensation arrangements,
and other matters of internal corporate governance. This Article, in other
words, focuses on contracts in which the branding implications are non
obvious, and in which lawyers may have an institutional role in advising the
client. 12
Lastly, I do not wish to overstate the importance of branding. The deals I
highlight here involve some unusual companies. This Article does not pur
port to prove that branding concerns caused the founders or managers to
adopt these structures, nor does it suggest that every deal has important
branding implications. 1 3 I certainly do not mean to suggest that these deals
originated in the marketing departments of these companies. Rather, this
Article claims that deal structures sometimes have branding implications
(whether by design or accident) and that lawyers ignore the implications at
their peril. The ethereal link between product markets and capital markets is
what makes the branding effects of deal structures both challenging and
promising as a new avenue of research.
I. UNDERSTANDING THE LEGAL INFRASTRUCTURE OF DEALS

What determines the legal infrastructure of deals? In Value Creation by
Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing, Ronald Gilson argues that
the defining activity of the corporate lawyer is minimizing transaction
costs. 1 4 Transaction costs do not refer simply to the costs associated with

12.
It may also be worth noting that this Article is not about the marketing of financial prod
ucts to investors. While financial innovation and the marketing of financial products are important
topics, those topics are beyond the scope of this Article. I am not focusing on how investment banks
change the legal structure of securities in order to sell securities. Rather, I am interested in how
firms and their lawyers tweak the legal structure of contracts in order to sell more widgets.
13.
These case studies do not prove that concerns about branding caused the companies to
adopt the structures I discuss. That is not the goal of this Article. Rather, I want to suggest that the
structures had branding effects. The case studies do generate some testable hypotheses that addi
tional empirical research could help prove or disprove. See Gregory Mitchell, Case Studies,
Counteifactuals, and Causal Explanations, 152 U. PA. L. REv. 1517 (2004). In addition, the Article
contributes to the legal-profession literature by suggesting that deal lawyers should be aware of
branding implications notwithstanding the occasional admonition from clients to stick to the "legal
issues" and leave the business concerns to other professionals.
14.
Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset P ricing,
94 YALE L.J. 239 (1984). Another important strand of the literature emphasizes the decision-making
process and long-term contracts. See Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, P rinciples of Relational
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"papering" the deal. Transaction costs include the costs of searching for an
appropriate exchange partner, negotiating the terms of the deal, producing
information, policing strategic behavior, and enforcing the contract. Gilson
focuses on deal hurdles that lawyers commonly address, like asymmetric

information and moral hazard. These problems can require costly monitor

ing by deal participants, cause buyers to discount the proj ected value of
assets, or even suffocate deals altogether under a blanket of suspicion.
Drawing on the work of economists and finance theorists like Ronald Coase,
5
Oliver Williamson, and Michael Jensen,1 Gilson argues that when lawyers

structure deals, they increase efficiency. Lawyers add value to the deal by

designing contracts that facilitate the flow of information and properly align

incentives. When the buyer and seller disagree about the value of an asset,

for example, lawyers might draft an earn-out agreement that links the price
16
of the asset to the actual earnings it generates.
Asymmetric information and strategic behavior are not the only costs

that transactional lawyers consider. Regulatory costs also affect deal struc
ture.17 Accounting treatment, tax incentives, antitrust concerns, and financial

intermediation rules may all come into play.

Ron Gilson, Victor Goldberg, David Schizer, and others at Columbia

Law School have developed an empirical case-study approach to examine
how deal lawyers create value when they engineer the legal infrastructure of
transactions.18 This Article adds a Gen-X flavor to the "Deals" approach,
extending and updating the work of the Columbia School with a brand

conscious examination of deal structuring. 19

I agree with the basic premise

of the Columbia School that the primary purpose of the legal infrastructure

Contracts, 67 VA. L. REV. 1089 (1981); Oliver Hart, Financial Contracting, 39 J. ECON. LITERA
TURE 1079, 1083-98 (2001).

15. See, e.g. , Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and
Takeovers, 76 AM. EcoN. REV. 323 (1986); Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of
the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Stru cture, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 30910 (1976) (discussing how agency problems can affect firm structure); Stewart C. Myers & Nicholas
S. Majluf, Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms Have Information That
Investors Do Not Have, 13 J. FIN. EcoN. 187, 195-98 (1984) (examining the effect of information
asymmetry on firm structure).

16.

See Gilson, supra note 14, at 262-65 (explaining how an earn-out agreement manages

information asymmetry).

17.

See id. at 246. But see Merton H. Miller, Debt and Taxes, 32 J. FIN. 261, 262 (1977) ("I

will argue that even in a world in which interest payments are fully deductible in computing corpo
rate income taxes, the value of the firm, in equilibrium will still be independent of its capital
structure.").

18. For a discussion of the Columbia approach, see Victor Fleischer, Deals: Bringing Corpo
rate Transactions into the Law School Classroom, 2002 CoLUM. Bus. L. REV. 475.
19.

Generation

X refers to Americans born roughly between 1965 and 1975. Our relationship

to brands and branding tends to be more complex and nuanced than the Baby Boomers'. We are
postmodernist, not modernist. Rather than earnestly fighting marketing and consumerism, we resign
ourselves to it or embrace it with a sense of irony. We acknowledge that brands help form our iden
tity, and we ultimately accept consumerism even as we recognize its drawbacks. For our generation,
the purchasing decision is rarely based only on functionality. Image matters more than it did before.
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of deals is to minimize transaction costs and regulatory costs.20 But I argue
here that deal structure may also affect a company's brand image. Contract
design helps form the identity of the firm and consumers' perception of the
firm
While the literatures on both corporate finance and branding are exten
sive, linking the two together is a new idea.21 The corporate finance
literature rarely discusses branding. Black & Gilson's textbook on the Law
.

and Finance of Corporate Acquisitions, for example, never mentions brand

2
ing. Neither does the leading corporate finance textbook. 2 Of course, I can
hardly claim to be the first scholar to emphasize the importance of under
standing the social context in which contracts are made. Beginning with the
3
"law in action" scholarship of Stewart Macaulay,2 scholars such as Ian
5
24
6
MacNeil, Robert Ellickson,2 and Lisa Bemstein2 have considered the im-

20. See also Manuel A. Utset, Producing Information: Initial Public Offerings, Production
Costs, and the Producing Lawyer, 74 OR. L. REV. 275 (1995) (drawing a distinction between the
lawyer's role in managing transaction costs and the lawyer's role in producing information).
21. Corporate finance scholars have considered whether brand image affects investors' pref
erences. See Joshua D. Coval & Tobias J. Moskowitz, Home Bias at Home: Local Equity Preference
in Domestic Portfolios, 54 J. FIN. 2045 (1999); Laura Frieder & Avanidhar Subrahmanyam, Brand
Perceptions and the Market for Common Stock, 40 J. FIN. & QUANT. ANALYSIS 57 (2005); Gur
Huberman, Familiarity Breeds Investment, 14 REv. FIN. STUD. 659 (2001). Only a few, however,
have touched on whether a firm's capital markets decisions affect consumer preferences. See James
C. Brau & Stanley E. Fawcett, Initial Public Offerings: An Analysis of Theory and Practice, 61 J.
FIN. 399 (2006) (finding that many high-tech firms go public for strategic reasons related to reputa
tion rather than out of a need for capital); Elizabeth Demers & Katharina Lewellen, The Marketing
Role of IPOs: Evidence from Internet Stocks, 68 J. FIN. EcoN. 413 (2003). A recent paper by law
professor Kim Krawiec considers whether law firm structuring decisions lead to changes in status,
which could be considered a branding effect. See Kimberly D. Krawiec, Organizational Form as
Status and Signal, 40 WAKE FoREST L. REv. 977 (2005).
22. See BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 2. The leading marketing textbooks, for that matter,
contain no references to financial structure. Marketing scholars have only begun recently to test the
effect of run-of-the-mill branding on shareholder value, let alone to consider whether financial con
tract design could itself affect brand equity, which in tum could affect firm value. See, e.g., Thomas
J. Madden, Frank Fehle & Susan M. Fournier, Brands Matter: An Empirical Demonstration of the
Creation of Shareholder Value Through Brands (May 2, 2002) (working paper on file with the au
thor), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=346953 (noting the "deeply
embedded cultural condition that distances marketing from the broader executive functions of the
firm" and, as an attempt to provide "a bridge across the marketing-finance divide," offering what the
authors contend is a "clear and compelling empirical demonstration of the relationship between
branding and the creation of shareholder value.").
23. See Stewart Macaulay, An Empirical View of Contract, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 465; Stewart
Macaulay, Elegant Models, Empirical Pictures, and the Complexities of Contract, 11 LAW & Soc'y
REV. 507 (1977); Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study,
28 AM. Soc. REv. 55 (1963).
24. See IAN R. MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT: AN INQUIRY INTO MODERN CON
TRACTUAL RELATIONS 71-117 (1980) (describing modem contract law in relational terms); Ian R.
Macneil, The Many Futures of Contracts, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 691 (1974).
25. See ROBERT c. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES
57-58 (1991).
26. See Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code 's Search
for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1765 (1996); Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the
Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the D iamond Industry , 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115
(1992).
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portance of noncontractual mechanisms on deal structure. Broadly speaking,
these scholars argue that to understand deals, we must look outside the four
comers of the contract and consider the institutional and social context in

which the parties strike a deal. Contract law, narrowly defined, exerts less
7
influence on transactions than we might expect.2 In relational agreements, it
is common for contract terms to be incomplete. Transactions are often en

forced outside of the courtroom by community norms and social sanctions.
What is particularly new about this Article, then, is not its focus outside the

four comers of the agreement, but rather its consideration of the reputational

impact that the contract design itself has in the eyes of those who are
parties to the contract (consumers and employees). 28

not

The link between corporate finance and branding may change the pro

fessional responsibilities of transactional lawyers. Branding has received
9
scant attention from the legal academy, outside of trademark scholars. 2

Corporate lawyers traditionally draw a line, albeit a fuzzy one, between le
3
gal issues and business issues. 0 If Gilson is right that lawyers are

transaction-cost engineers, then the distinction between legal issues and

27.

Mark C. Suchman, The Contract as Social Anif act,

37 LAW & Soc'y REv. 91, 96 (2003)

("The key finding here is that 'Contract Law,' as the doctrinalists study it, exerts remarkably little
influence on a remarkably wide range of transactions.").

28.

This Article also draws conceptually on a research agenda proposed by sociologist Mark

Suchman in a recent article analyzing contracts as "social artifacts." Id. Starting with the intuitive
point that the meaning of a contract depends on its social context, Suchman explores the idea that
contracts are tools. Like a screwdriver used as a door stop, contracts may be used in ways its design
ers may not have originally intended. See id. at 109. Suchman notes:
Employed with a little ingenuity, detailed contingency provisions can serve to discourage close
reading, as much as to ensure mutual agreement; standard-form contracts can serve to disem
power front-line sales staff, as much as to constrain transaction partners; and dispute resolution
procedures can serve to extract proprietary business information as much as to determine fair
remedies. Far from undermining the engineering metaphor, such instances of user creativity
simply demonstrate the need for ethnographies of contract practice, parallel to the existing eth
nographies of other technology practices.

Id. (internal citations omitted).
These "off-label" uses of contracts may change the way that we measure efficiency and may
force the use of multiple design criteria. Id. at

109-10 ("Researchers have already begun to explore

various extra-contractual influences on contract blueprints, and future investigations will almost
certainly explore the extra-contractual consequences of such blueprints, as well. As these explora
tions proceed, even the meaning of technical efficacy itself may expand to incorporate multiple
design criteria, rather than transaction-cost minimization alone. The engineering metaphor provides
little reason to believe that efficient, positive-sum collaboration will always be the sole, or even the
primary, technical objective in contract design.").
Suchman's approach does not undermine the notion of transaction-cost minimization as a
measure of contract efficiency, but it stresses that the efficiency of contract design may vary depend
ing on the user. Deals are not one-size-fits-all; your mileage may vary. Branding, then, is just one
way of measuring the success or failure of a particular contract design, by a particular firm, in a
particular product market.

29.

For an overview of the legal framework that protects investments in reputation, see Wil

liam M. Landes

& Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. & EcoN.

265 (1987).
30.

But see Jill Schachner Chanen, The Strategic Lawyer, A.B.A. J., July 2005, at 43, 45-47

(discussing increasing pressure for lawyers to think strategically about the business implications of
legal decisions).
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business issues begins to break down. Designing the structure of a deal is an
endeavor that must be pursued jointly between lawyers and other profes
sionals. Lawyers add value to transactions by allocating risks properly
through contract, and their negotiations and decisions affect incentives and
3
change how businesses run operations moving forward. 1 And if I am right

that deal structures have branding effects, then the distinction between legal
and business decisions breaks down even further. Lawyers can and should
include the deal's effect on brand equity in their back-of-the-envelope cost

benefit analysis of different deal structures, in addition to the effect on man
agers, shareholders, employees, and creditors.
What is not clear from these case studies is whether, as a general matter,

lawyers are particularly talented when it comes to understanding the brand

ing implications of deal structures. But whether they are naturaliy suited to
the task or not, they are inevitably involved in the decision-making process
that leads to the final structure of the deal. The clearest example of a situa

tion in which counsel ought to speak up is when a structure is efficient from
the point of view of managing transaction costs and regulatory costs but

would produce negative branding effects, as in the Stanley Works case.

Lawyers should not only listen to the branding concerns of management, but

also ask the right questions and draw on their prior experience in structuring

deals. For some deals, like IPOs or major acquisitions, the lawyers may have

vastly more experience than management. Investment bankers, of course,

may be in an even stronger position to advise the client.

Even if one hesitates to embrace this expansive notion of the role of the

deal lawyer, it's not clear that lawyers can responsibly avoid any and all
consideration of branding. As explained more below, unusual deal structures

not otherwise explained by transaction-cost concerns or regulatory-cost

concerns might then be explained by either managerial consumption on the

one hand or branding and consumer signaling on the other. Consumer sig

naling may

be an

appropriate

action for

the firm ,

but managerial

consumption is not. Only by considering the branding implications can

counsel determine whether the firm is acting in the best interests of the
shareholders.

Consider the predicament of Google's outside counsel. Should Wilson
Sonsini have permitted the founders to include a "letter" to shareholders in
the prospectus, even though it was likely to complicate and delay the SEC

approval process? Should the founders have been permitted to indulge in

math humor when they chose the number of shares to be issued? Some law-

31. The view of the lawyer-as-hired-gun is more of a straw man than an accurate depiction
of how many transactional lawyers spend their time advising clients. See Ian Ayres, Never Confuse
Efficiency with a l iver Complaint, 1997 Wis. L. REv. 503, 513. Most scholars and practitioners
recognize that the line between business and legal issues is not so clear. See Robert A. Kagan &
Robert Eli Rosen, On the Social Signifi cance of Large Law Firm Practice, 37 STAN. L. REV. 399,
407 (1985) (discussing the dominant image of lawyer as independent counselor in connection with
JAMES STEWART, THE PARTNERS (1983)). They can "fill a managerial void with the uncommitted
resources of intellect, energy, and experience that only large law firms have on tap, thus bolstering
the corporation's adaptive capacities." Id.; see also id. at 410 (describing aspects of the dominant
image of lawyers as counselors).
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yers would articulate a professional responsibility to fight with the founders
and managers on these points. After all, if the actions merely reflect the

idiosyncratic preferences of quirky founders, then company counsel has a

duty to step in and protect the shareholders. But if I am right that deal struc
tures

have

branding

implications,

it

follows

that

lawyers

have

a

responsibility to help the founders consider the risks (and rewards) of the

unusual contract design. That the deal may tarnish or enhance a firm's brand
image becomes yet another factor for the lawyers to consider, not unlike
accounting risk, tax risk, or counterparty credit risk. Indeed, lawyers may be
especially well suited to advise their clients about the nonlegal effects of
32
legal decisions, including branding effects.
II. CASE STUDIES
This Section considers the branding effects of four deals. They are not
representative of all deals, nor do they provide a comprehensive view of the
ways in which the legal infrastructure of deals can have branding effects.
But they are tangible stories that help illustrate how and why branding mat

ters. In Section IV, I offer a more systematic approach to thinking about

branding and deal structure. Before getting to the theory, however, it may be

useful to consider some real-world examples.
A.

Google

Last summer, Google went public in a highly public manner. Rather than
use the traditional underwriter-led book-building process, Google instead

sold its stock to the public using an Internet auction. Wall Street watched the

deal closely and criticized it extensively. After several delays, the auction
closed successfully with an offering price of $85. The stock closed its first

day of trading at $ 100 for a first-day pop of 1 8%. The stock then began its
steady climb towards $400. The numerous problems Google faced in exe

cuting the deal suggest it was hardly a model of efficiency. Nor was it a
33
model of egalitarianism. But, I argue here, the deal was a success on its

own terms. There was more than short-term efficiency at stake. Google used
the IPO as a branding event, and the auction structure created branding ef

fects in a way the traditional IPO structure would not have.

32.

Kagan and Rosen explain:

More detached and independent than a corporate chief executive's subordinates, the lawyer
can feel free to warn business executives that even if proposed actions do not violate the law
per se, they might nevertheless be ethically questionable or might lead to popular or political
attacks, adverse reactions by customers or competitors, or intensified governmental scrutiny.

Id. at 410. We are used to giving this lawyerly role the more dignified name of counseling. But when
we talk about "popular or political attacks" or "adverse reactions by customers," we are already
talking about branding. Kagan and Rosen believe, however, that the dominant image was in decline
even as they wrote the article twenty years ago. Id. at 422-31.
33.
See Christine Hurt, What Google Can 't Tell Us about Internet Auctions (And What It
Can) , 37 U. ToL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2006), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=753625.
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1. The Timing of the Deal
Sergey Brin and Larry Page met as computer science graduate students

in 1 995. The two founded Google and developed a search technology based
on the "back links" to websites. By 1 999, the company began to grow, and it
received $25 million in financing from Sequoia Capital and Kleiner Perkins,

two leading venture capital firms. The company could have gone public ear

lier, when the equity markets were hungry for any technology company, let

alone one with Google's strong track record and promising future. Eric
34
Schmidt (the CEO), Brin, and Page held off. They enjoyed the freedom of
35
remaining a private company, and they had no pressing need for cash.
Google went public in the summer of 2004. The timing was a bit puz

ziing. Compaiiies normally go public because they need additional equity

capital. Google had no pressing need for cash, and so in theory it could have
36
remained a private company. For several reasons, it made sense for Google

to go public when it did. None of these reasons, however, required Google
to maximize its short-term share price.

Backdoor public company. The precipitating event was somewhat un

usual. One advantage Google enjoyed as a private company is that it could

hold its business strategy close to the vest. Its growth, however, eventually
made this strategy impossible. Like most start-ups, Google had given stock

to employees. As it recruited programmers and engineers, more and more

employees became stockholders. Under the securities laws, any company
with 300 stockholders has to make certain public filings. These public fil

ings would have required some disclosure of Google's business plan and
3
prospects, making Google a "backdoor" public company. 7 And because
Google would have had to make aspects of its business strategy public under
the required filings, the founders lost a key reason for remaining privately
owned.

Liquidity. Going public made sense for other reasons as well. Employees
3
who receive stock and options expect to sell at some point. 8 Without a liq34. See JOHN BATTELLE, THE SEARCH: How GooGL E AND ITS RIVALS REWROTE THE RULES
OF BUSINESS AND TRANSFORMED OUR CULTURE 2 1 3 (2005) ("In an interview with the San Fran
cisco Chronicle in the fall of 200 1 , Eric Schmidt laid down what would become the triumvirate's
standard answer to the IPO question. 'The IPO question we've debated internally, but frankly, we're
profitable,' Schmidt said. 'We're generating cash. We don't ever need to go public.' ").
35. The company was already profitable by 200 1 . See Google Inc., Registration Statement
(Form S- 1 ) (Apr. 29, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1 288776/
0001 193 1 2504073639/ds l .htm#toc l 6 1 67_1 l .
36.
Other scholars have noted, of course, that the reasons for going public may be more
complicated. See Lynn A. Stout, The Unimportance of Being Efficient: An Economic Analysis of
Stock Market P ricing and Securities Regulation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 613, 645 (1988) (arguing that
firms rarely use equity issues to raise capital).
37.
Becoming a backdoor public company also refers to a process in which a larger privately
held company merges with a shell company that is publicly traded. I use the term here to refer to the
accidental method of becoming a company required to make public filings simply by accumulating
at least 300 stockholders.
38.
Another liquidity option is to borrow against the stock. Without a public market, how
ever, lenders would have difficulty valuing the stock.
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uid market for shares, employees could not capture the full value of their
options. Going public allowed the founders, employees, and investors to sell
3
and thereby diversify their portfolios. 9
Because excessive insider selling would have depressed the stock price
(which would have been self-defeating), selling was limited by contract. The
founders, venture capitalists, and employees sold some shares in the IPO
and in secondary offerings in the months following the IPO, but most of

their equity would remain locked up in Google for a relatively long time.
Acquisition currency. A third reason for going public was to facilitate

acquisitions. Companies often use their own stock as acquisition currency.

Google was eyeing some potentially large acquisitions, and having a liquid

market for its stock would facilitate tax-free acquisitions. After announcing
4
the IPO, Google acquired Picasa, a digital photo management company; 0
41
42
Keyhole, a digital mapping company; Urchin, a web analytics company;
43
and Dodgeball, a social networking site.
But there was no pressing need for cash. A higher share price would

make any stock-for-stock acquisitions cheaper. At the same time, Google's
advertising products were generating sufficient cash flow to meet the com

pany's operating needs. Google had some desire to build a war chest for

future acquisitions, but had no immediate big targets. Moreover, the IPO

would not be Google's last chance to raise money in the equity markets, as
44
evidenced by their recent follow-on offering.

In sum, Google had to go public, but it was less concerned about short

term share price than many other companies. Maximizing the offering price

(so as to maximize the amount of capital raised) was not as important as

building long-term value. The IPO presented itself as a perfect branding
moment.
Despite Google's enviable position, it faced a few challenges. The tim

ing of the IPO was not ideal. The dot-com bubble was over. Few companies
went public in 2004, and it was hard to imagine an Internet technology

company, even Google, receiving a warm reception from gun-shy investors.
But with the threat of becoming a "backdoor" public company looming, and
increasing pressure to provide liquidity for employees and the venture capi

talists, the IPO had to be executed one way or another. It was a treacherous

39.
Schmidt has acknowledged that the presence of venture investors (and their demands for
liquidity) made an IPO inevitable. BATTELLE, supra note 34, at 2 14.
40. Google Press Release, Google Acquires Picasa, http://www.google.com/press/pressrel/
picasa.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2006).
4 1 . Google Press Release, Google Acquires Keyhole Corp, http://www.google.com/press/
pressrel/keyhole.htrnl (last visited Mar. 20, 2006).
42. Google Press Release, Google Agrees to Acquire Urchin, http://www.google.com/intl/en/
press/pressrel/urchin.htrnl (last visited Mar. 20, 2006).
43.

John Markoff, 14,159,265 New Slices of Rich Technology, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2005, at

Cl.
44. A follow-on offering occurs when a company offers new shares to the market at some
point in time after an IPO. A secondary offering, by contrast, occurs when an existing shareholder
sells a block of shares to the market.
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situation. The way out was to think creatively, or, as Apple-lovers might say,
45

to "think different" about the IPO process.

2. The Appeal of the Auction Structure
IPOs have an image problem. Before the dot-com bubble burst, tech

IPOs were associated with severe underpricing and huge first-day pops. In
siders got rich; companies left money on the table; retail investors got hurt
when the bubble eventually burst. 46 The challenge for Google was to tum a
process associated with greed into something positive. Structuring its IPO as
an auction did the trick.

It may be useful here to review briefly the traditional IPO process. Jn a

traditional IPO, a company that needs capital approaches the underwriters
who will help take the company public. The underwriters set up a road show
where managers talk with potential investors. The underwriters also meet

with institutional investors and discuss the company behind closed doors,

setting the price through a process known as "book-building." Underwriters

then follow up with investors, who express indications of interest and the
price at which they would be willing to buy the stock. Based on these indi
cations of interest, the underwriters and the company agree on a price.

Critics of the traditional IPO process focus on two controversial aspects:

pricing and allocation. Pricing an IPO is more art than science. For reasons

that remain controversial, the company and its underwriters typically set the

price somewhat lower than the anticipated market price. During the dot-com
bubble, Internet stocks debuted with first-day pops of

100% or more, creat

ing opportunities for abusive practices that benefited Wall Street insiders
.
47
and corporate executives.
48
Underpricing has received a great deal of academic attention. Histori

cally, IPOs are underpriced by an average of eighteen percent. Most

45.

Apple's "Think Different" ad campaign featured pictures of creative thinkers like Albert

Einstein, Jim Henson, John Lennon, Mahatma Gandhi, and Ted Turner. Apple received some

flak

for the apparent grammatical error, although some have pointed out that "Different" may not be an
adverb modifying "Think", but rather an object of the verb "Think," a use which could be acceptable
vernacular, like "think big" or "think playful." See Multimedia Language Lab, Apple's Think Differ

7,
2006); Invention Convention, http://www.inventionconvention.com/grammar.html (last visited Feb.
7, 2006).
ent Campaign, http://www.bu.edu/celop/mll/callffechNote-think_different.html (last visited Feb.

46.
(2005).
47.

Christine Hurt, Moral Hazard and the Initial P ublic Offering,

26 CARDOZO L. REV. 7 1 1

Id. at 7 1 5.

E.g., Janet Cooper Alexander, The Lawsuit Avoidance Theory of Why Initial Public Of 
48.
ferings are Underpriced, 4 1 UCLA L. REV. 1 7 ( 1 993); Richard A . Booth, The Efficient Market,
Ponfolio Theory, and the Downward Sloping D emand Hypotheses, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 1 87, 12031 1 ( 1 993) (arguing that a downward-sloping demand curve explains the phenomenon of underpric
ing); Richard A. Booth, D iscounts and Other Mysteries of Corporate Finance, 19 CAL. L. REV.
1 055, 1 095 ( 1 99 1 ) (noting the growth in popularity of Dutch auctions); Sean J. Griffith, Spinning
and Underpricing: A Legal and Economic Analysis of the P referential Allocation ofShares in Initial
P ublic Offerings, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 583, 658-61 (2004) (arguing that IPO allocation practices
harm issuers, and proposing that individuals should be barred from participating in IPOs).
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financial economists believe that the traditional book-building process is
efficient, despite (or because of) underpricing. Underpricing may be neces
sary to compensate institutional investors for investing in price-discovery

activities, or to compensate them for the risk of investing in bad deals. Bruce
Johnsen and others argue that syndicates, along with underpricing, improve
the efficiency of the system by discouraging overinvestment in information
4
seeking behavior by potential investors. 9 In their model, underpricing al
lows the investors to "buy blind" rather than engage in a competition to
50
unearth information about the company to price the issue more accurately.
Whatever its efficiency, the book-building process still smells fishy to

legal scholars, who tend to focus more on egalitarian considerations than
5
5
economists do. 1 The SEC's mission is to protect the small investor. 2 In re

cent years legal scholars have become more interested in the "Dutch

auction" model of selling stock in IPOs. The investment bank Hambrecht
53

has developed and refined an "Auction IPO" model in the United States.

An auction uses a different price-revealing mechanism than the tradi

tional book-building process. In an auction, investors bid on the Internet for

the issuer's stock. The clearing price-that is, the price at which the com

pany sells the stock to the underwriters-is set at the highest price at which
the company can sell the number of shares it wants to sell. Anyone who has

placed a bid higher than the clearing price receives an allocation of shares at

the clearing price, even if they bid higher. Bidders thus may go ahead and

disclose their reservation price. If they guess too high, they will not be pun

ished, but instead will receive stock at the clearing price, like everyone
54
else. Because the bids of investors correlate closely with the bids that arise

in the secondary market after trading begins, underpricing the stock may be
55
unnecessary.

49. Yoram Barze!, Michel A. Habib & D. Bruce Johnsen, Prevention is Better than Cure:
Precluding Information Acquisition in IPOs (Apr. 2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
author).
50.

Id. at 1 .

5 1 . A few legal scholars believe that egalitarian concerns have n o place in the IP O regulatory
landscape. E.g., Ely R. Levy, The Law and Economics of /P O Favoritism and Regulatory Spin, 33
Sw. U. L. REV. 1 85 , 2 1 6 (2004) (arguing that pro rata allocations are harmful because they interfere
with the price-revealing mechanism that institutional investors provide as part of the book-building
process). Most legal scholars, however, believe that transparency and democratic access are impor
tant values to be protected by regulation. See, e.g. , Sean J. Griffith, The Puzzling Persistence of the
Fixed Price Offering: Implicit Price Discrimination in IPOs, 1 8 (Oct. 3 1 , 2005) (unpublished manu
script, on file with author), available at http://ssm.com/abstract==797865 ("The loser in this bargain
is the issuer and, of course, the transparency and efficiency of the primary market.").
52. See The Investor's Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integ
rity, and Facilitates Capital Formation, http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last visited Feb.
1 8, 2006).
53.

Selling stock through auctions has historically been more common overseas.

54.

In a pure Dutch auction, bidders pay the price they bid, not the clearing price.

55.
for risk.

Even in a Dutch auction, some underpricing may be necessary to compensate investors
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The differences between auctions and book-building go beyond the

technological leap from the telephone to the Internet. Using an auction af
fects not only the price mechanism, but also the allocation mechanism.
56
Auctions

Unlike a traditional IPO, anyone with a computer can participate.

are more democratic and egalitarian. Because the allocation process elimi

nates favoritism, it also eliminates the possibility of using underpriced IPO
shares to benefit insiders or curry favor with clients. Christine Hurt has ad

vocated a move towards auction IPOs to reduce moral hazard. Other legal

scholars remain skeptical. Anita Indira Anand argues that auction structures

may not reduce underpricing and that fairness in allocation may not lead to
5
an improvement in market efficiency. 7 Peter Oh argues that Dutch auctions
are risky and susceptible to fraud, and he shows that the benefits are un5s
proven.

When Google announced its intentions to conduct an IPO by auction,

the financial press took notice. Google would become by far the largest and

most prominent company to sell IPO stock by auction. The financial press
pitched the story as Silicon Valley populism versus Wall Street capitalism,

making it the deal to watch during an otherwise sleepy summer for the capi
tal markets. Google scored some early PR victories. It strong-armed the
white-shoe underwriters into cutting their usual hefty fees, and it forced
59
them to accept a more democratic IPO process. No more Friends of Frank;

Google would conduct its auction according to its company mantra, Don't

Be Evil.

3. Execution of the Deal
Conducting an Internet auction forced Google into the role of regulatory
6()
entrepreneur. Securities laws prohibit offers to sell securities until a regis

tration statement is effective; the registration statement cannot become

56.
Ironically, this may lead institutional investors to react like Groucho Marx: because
anyone can participate, it's not clear why anyone would want to participate. Without underpricing,
investors have no incentive to bid on the IPO stock because they can wait and acquire the stock in
the secondary market at the same price.
57. Anita Indira Anand, Is the Dutch Auction /P O a Good Idea ? (Yale Law Sch. Ctr. for
Law, Econ. & Pub. Pol'y, Working Paper No. 320, 2005), available at http://ssm.com/
abstract=794464. Anand points to institutional considerations that make price discovery more effi
cient in book-built offerings. Id. at 1 1 -18. Analyzing the IPO process as a public good, she argues
that the results of allowing unimpeded access to retail investors may be undesirable from a market
efficiency standpoint. Id. at 22-30. Anand notes that larger, more widely known issuers may benefit
from an auction mechanism, particularly for follow-on and secondary offerings. See id. at 40.
Somewhat generously, she describes Google's IPO as successful from an efficiency standpoint. Id.
at 33.
58. Peter B. Oh, The Dutch Auction Myth (William Mitchell Legal Studies Research Paper
No. 33, 2006), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=890 127.
59.
"Friends of Frank" refers to friends and clients of CSFB's Frank Quattrone, who led
many of the high-profile tech IPOs. Friends of Frank received allocations of underpriced IPO shares
in return for the promise of future investment banking business.
60. See A Taxing Blog, http://vic.typepad.com/taxingblog/2005/04/google_as_regul.html
(Apr. 26, 2005).
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effective until the final price is determined. In an auction, however, the final
price cannot be determined until offers to buy the stock have been received,
creating a catch-22. The SEC had previously issued no-action letters con
cerning online auctions to Wit Capital, Hambrecht, and Bear Stearns.6 1
Google moved forward with the auction, working closely with the SEC to
establish systems for ( 1) setting the price through indications of interest
rather than binding bids, and (2) confirming bids after the registration
statement was declared effective.
The size of Google's offering forced a difficult decision early on. Most
companies that conduct auctions do so through Hambrecht, the auction pio
neer. Hambrecht has an infrastructure in place to handle auction IPOs.
Google was concerned, however, that their offering needed more assistance
from traditional underwriters, who can reach out to institutional investors.
Google retained Hambrecht to advise on the offering but chose the more
traditional investment banks Morgan Stanley and CSFB to lead the syndi
cate. Some viewed the choice of investment banks as a missed opportunity
to further egalitarian reform of the IPO process.62
PR for the deal took a hit when the investment banks made access to the
deal somewhat difficult for individual investors. To ensure that bids were
serious, the banks required that investors have high minimum account bal
ances to make a bid. Rumors circulated that some banks required minimum
account balances of half a million dollars. The auction would not be as
egalitarian as initially promised. Google responded by expanding the syndi
cate to include smaller firms, including E*TRADE, some of which required
minimum balances as low as $2,000.63
The next hurdle concerned the issue of insider selling. Traditionally, un
derwriters ask insiders to agree not to sell any stock within 1 80 days of the
initial offering. Google had no such agreement in place, and analysts began
to question whether insider selling would put excessive pressure on the
stock price immediately following the offering. Eventually, the founders and
venture capitalists cut back on the number of shares they would sell in the
initial offering, and management agreed to a waterfall-style lockup agree
ment, with increasing numbers of shares sold after 15, 90, 120, 1 50, and 1 80
days.
Google's road show brought acrimony from analysts as well. Investors
complained that Google disclosed little information about the company's
plans. Mary Meeker, a high profile analyst, complained that she had never
dealt with a company as unhelpful as Google. Institutional investors accus
tomed to receiving favored treatment had little advantage over any small
investor with a computer.

6 1 . Hurt, supra note 33, at 8; Bear, Stearns & Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 2000 WL
1 0 1 3584 (July 20, 2000); W.R. Hambrecht & Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 2000 WL 987735 (July
1 2, 2000); Wit Capital Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2000 WL 1 0 1 3585 (July 20, 2000 ) ; Wit Capi
tal Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1 999 WL 49854 (July 1 4, 1 999).
62.

See Hurt, supra note 33.

63.

Id. at 14.
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The deal was delayed into August, bringing yet more trouble. The buzz
started to fade; August is a slow month on Wall Street, as bankers and trad
ers depart for Nantucket, Martha's Vineyard, or the Hamptons. Things got
even worse on August 1 2, when an issue of Playboy magazine reached the
newsstands; the timing could not have been worse. The magazine had
printed an interview with Brin and Page talking about the company. Publica
tion of the article arguably violated the gun-jumping rules, which companies
often address by halting the IPO process and "cooling off." Google managed
to keep the process moving by filing yet another amendment to the registra
tion statement, reprinting the article in full, and disclosing the risk in the
64
prospectus. Google then disclosed that it had failed to register certain
shares received by service providers, potentially violating SEC rules. The
bidding process finally began on August 13. Demand appeared soft, and
Google lowered its price target from $108-135 to $85-95 a share. To Wall
Street insiders, Google was beginning to look amateurish, not innovative.
The auction finally closed, and Google sold the stock to the underwriters
at $85 per share, who then distributed it to the bidders. Successful bidders
(i.e., anyone who bid over $85) were allocated 75% of their requested
shares, suggesting that Google intentionally left some money on the table to
ensure a positive first-day close and compensate those bidders who had
stuck it out. The stock closed its first day of trading at $ 1 00, in line with the
historical underpricing average of 1 8%.
In sum, the deal did not go altogether swimmingly. Wall Street resented
having to accept an innovative deal structure that weakened the control and
importance of the underwriters. Institutional investors may have invested
less effort in investigating the company, resulting in lower bids. Stock
market pundit Jim Cramer explained:
The "go it alone" method that Google used was a total fiasco, just ridicu
lous. The arrogance, the incompetence was beyond belief. Their own
missteps and misbehavior have brought much lower prices than they ever
would have gotten for the deal. Institutions, mutual funds and hedge funds
all are boycotting the deal. So the price will be artificially low. These guys
65

will have totally messed it up for themselves.

It is hard to disagree with Cramer's conclusion that Google left money
on the table. But in hindsight, with Google now trading near $400, and hav
ing successfully completed a $4 billion. follow-on offering, I'm not sure it's
fair to say that the Google guys "totally messed it up for themselves."
64. If the magazine article violated the gun-jumping rules, investors would constructively
acquire a put option (an option to sell the stock back to Google at the offering price) along with the
Google shares. This may help explain the underpricing of the deal, as the underpricing moves the
strike price of this constructive put option out of the money. As long as the price of Google remains
above the offering price, in other words, the Playboy article isn't a problem, as no shareholder
would want to exercise its remedy by selling the stock back to the company at the low offering
price. By lowering the offering price, underpricing thus serves as an (expensive) method of insur
ance against gun-jumping liability.
65.
James J. Cramer, How to Buy Google: After the Deal, REALMONEY.COM, Aug. 1 8, 2004,
quoted in Hurt, supra note 33, at 23.
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Whether the deal was successful depends on the metric one uses to measure
success.
4. Evaluating the Deal: Efficiency
Few would characterize the Google IPO as efficient. It is difficult to
know what would have happened if Google had instead used the traditional
book-building method. The unusual deal structure certainly drove up legal
fees. Google paid its underwriters a 3% commission, well below the indus
try standard 7-8%, but its ability to drive down investment-banking fees
came primarily from its market power, not its selection of an auction proc
ess. It seems likely the company could have raised more money had it used
the traditional IPO process. Following the IPO, institutional investors rushed
to buy the stock, pushing the price higher and higher.
Jim Cramer is not alone in thinking that the offering price would have
been higher if Google had done a traditional IPO. The central problem faced
by IPO issuers is the information asymmetry between the issuer and poten
tial buyers. Issuers overcome this problem by disclosing information and by
66
renting the reputation of financial intermediaries. Google did a poor job on
both counts. They were tight-lipped about the company, disclosing little in
formation other than the basic financial information and risk factors
required by the SEC. The founders' letter, while entertaining, was short on
useful insight about the company's plans. As far as renting reputation,
Google hired Morgan Stanley and CSFB to lead the syndicate. But even
here, Google showed little interest in gathering up the support of intermedi
aries. After Google slashed fees, Merrill Lynch walked away from the deal.
While Google did receive the implicit endorsement of the many banks that
remained in the syndicate, the ill will it generated by slashing fees may have
reduced selling efforts. Moreover, auctions are associated with less under
pricing, removing an incentive for institutional investors who might
otherwise have gotten involved. And without the firm promise of under
priced shares, the underwriters had little financial incentive to push the stock
on their favored clients.
In sum, the post-IPO run-up in Google's stock price suggests that the
deal structure may indeed have left money on the table. Without a clear
promise of underpricing and no possibility of a favorable allocation even if
they did participate, institutional investors had little reason to investigate the
company. It cost them very little to wait until the stock began trading on the
secondary market. The run-up in the stock price thus may have been caused
by the inability of the auction process to reduce the information asymmetry
between Google and its potential investors. Post-IPO events and

66. See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakrnan, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70
VA. L. REv. 549 ( 1984).
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announcements may have contributed to the run-up in the stock price, but it
is hard to imagine such events accounting for the full increase.67
5. Evaluating the Deal: Branding Effects
Despite these apparent flaws in both design and execution, the Google
IPO should be considered a success. The IPO was not just a financing trans
action; it was a branding moment. It generated benefits for Google outside
8
the four comers of the prospectus.6 Each story in the business press was a
love letter to customers who value corporate integrity. From a corporate
finance perspective, the deal was at best mediocre. From a marketing per
spective, it was simply brilliant.
Google, more than most, needs a good brand image to ensure long-term
success. Marketing theory helps explain why this is so. Products may be
9
categorized as search goods, experience goods, and credence goods.6
Search goods are goods for which consumers may easily assess quality be
fore purchase, like clothing or furniture. Experience goods are goods for
which consumers may easily assess quality after purchase, like a haircut or a
lawnmower. Credence goods are goods for which quality is difficult to as
sess even after purchase, like financial advice, auto repair, or education.
Branding is especially important for experience goods and credence
7°
goods. Google's search engine is an experience good. For such goods,
branding is a way for a seller to commit to product attributes that are diffi
cult for third parties (such as courts) to verify.7 1 The search engine and other
Google products might even be considered credence goods. Consumers
would find it difficult to verify the quality of search results, even after exam
ining the results, unless they also sampled other search engines. In theory,
consumers could spend a few hours running experiments, trying out differ
ent searches on each site and comparing results. Few consumers, however,
are so diligent. Comparing results, moreover, is not so easy. Only with care
ful inspection can one figure out which sites, deep in the results, one search
engine discovered and another did not. Often the relevance of results is not

67. The auction structure may also have encouraged a post-IPO increase in revenue by
spreading ownership of the stock out more broadly. Search engines have network effects, and broad
based stock ownership may nudge investors to use Google. I am indebted to Bruce Johnsen for
identifying this point.
68.
A more formal way of stating this idea is to consider the positive externalities of the IPO.
Some economists have noted the effect. See, e.g. , Alexander Ljungqvist, !PO Underpricing: A Sur
vey, in HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE FINANCE: EMPIRICAL CORPORATE FINANCE (B. Espen Eckbo ed.,
forthcoming 2007) (manuscript at I , on file with author), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=609422 ("The act of going public itself shines a spotlight on the company, and the atten
dant publicity may bring indirect benefits, such as attracting a different caliber of manager.").
69.

Fleischer, supra note 1 1 .

See I.P.L. Png & David Reitman, Why Are Some Products Branded and Others Not?, 38
70.
J.L. & EcoN. 207, 209 ( 1 995) ("[S]ellers are more likely to brand when consumers find personal
search and experimentation relatively unattractive.").

7 1 . See Benjamin Klein & Keith B. Leffler, The Role ofMarket Forces in Assuring Contrac
tual Performance, 89 J. PoL. EcoN. 6 1 5 ( 1 98 1 ).
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apparent without clicking through. Rather than experiment with different
products, consumers rely on word-of-mouth and brand image.
Other search engines and Internet portals, like Ask.com, Yahoo! and
America Online spend lavishly on advertising to convey a sense of relevance
or usefulness to consumers. Google's branding strategy, on the other hand,
is subtle. It relies on the diffusion of buzz through informal networks. It has
72
a blog targeted at early adopters that introduces and discusses new prod
ucts. Because Google derives most of its profits from advertising revenue, it
can give away most of its products and services for free, relying on users to
pass along knowledge to friends, family, and colleagues.
Google is well aware of both the importance of its brand and the chal
lenges it faces in enhancing and protecting the brand. The risk-factor section
of the S-3 to their recent follow-on offering explains that the business "de
pends on a strong brand." Google notes that its management of information
raises privacy concerns, making the integrity of the brand that much more
important. 73 Litigation involving Google is high profile, and as the legal is
sues get resolved, Google must also win in the court of public opinion.74
The IPO structure enhanced Google's brand image in several ways.
Playfalness and Geek Humor. The name Google derives from a mathe
matical term, Googol, which means the numeral one followed by 1 00
zeros. 75 From a branding perspective, "Google" appears at first glance to be
an arbitrary word, like Apple or BlackBerry, with no obvious tie-in to the
company. It also conveys playfulness, however, and tells an inside joke
known to mathematicians. The mathematics tie-in is not deeply hidden,
however. Instead, it's just hidden enough to trigger questions from business
reporters, who then convey the clue to the public, letting them in on the
joke. The name also conveys a functional meaning: Google can search large

72.
On early adopters, see generally MALCOLM GLADWELL, THE TIPPING POINT: How LIT
TLE THINGS CAN MAKE A BIG DIFFERENCE ( ! st paperback ed. 2002), and EVERETT M. ROGERS,
DIFFUSION OF INNOVATIONS (5th ed. 2003).
73. Google explains that "people have raised privacy concerns relating to the ability of our
Gmail email service to w:itch relevant ads to the content of email messages. In addition, some indi
viduals and organizations have raised objections to our scanning of copyrighted materials from
library collections for use in our Google Print product." Google, Inc. Registration Statement (Form
S-3), at 9 (Aug. 18, 2005).
74. See A Taxing Blog, http://vic.typepad.com/taxingblog/2005/06/googles_copyrig.html
(June
30,
2005);
Posting
of Brad
Hill
to
the
Unofficial
Google
Weblog,
http://google.weblogsinc.com/entry/1 234000483056521 (Aug. 29, 2005).
75.

The company website explains:

Google is a play on the word googol, which was coined by Milton Sirotta, nephew of Ameri
can mathematician Edward Kasner, and was popularized in the book, Mathematics and the
Imagination by Kasner and James Newman. It refers to the number represented by the numeral
I followed by JOO zeros. Google's use of the term reflects the company's mission to organize
the immense, seemingly infinite amount of information available on the web.
Google Corporate Information: Google Milestones, http://www.google.com/corporate/history.html
(last visited Mar. 29, 2006).
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numbers of sites-a googol sites, perhaps-and offer the user the most rele
vant hits.76
The playfulness extended to the IPO. A story in Wired entitled "More
Reasons to Love Google" explained that the amount of money that Google
sought to raise, $2,7 1 8,28 1,828, was a bit of "geek humor."77 2.7 1 828 1 828 is
the mathematical constant e, or Euler's number, which is the base of the
natural-logarithm function.78
Google continued winking at the nerds in its follow-on offering in Au
gust 2005, selling 14, 1 59,265 shares. The number represents the first eight
digits after the decimal in the mathematical constant pi.79 Other examples of
Google's math humor include the numbering of its buildings in Mountain
View, which include Buildings phi (also known as the golden mean or
golden ratio), e, and pi.8c The numbering systems of the buiidings and the
stock offerings also pay homage to Donald Knuth, a professor in the Stan
ford Computer Science Department (where Sergey and Larry met). Knuth's
TEX program has versions 3. 1 , 3. 14, 3. 141 and so on, and his METAFONT
has versions 2.7, 2.7 1 , 2.718, and so on.81
And the auction process itself, of course, is interesting, fun, and intrigu
ing. It is a technologically savvy way to gather and manage information.
Instead of websites or web-maps, the information gathered and managed in
the IPO was the price and allocation preferences of thousands of investors.
Google IPO, like Google Search, Google Maps, and Google Talk, became
not just a transaction but a technologically-appealing method of managing
information.
It would be quite a struggle to explain these choices-particularly the
number of shares-with an unbranded, pure efficiency rationale. Like a
monkey typing the collected works of Shakespeare, an investment-banking
analyst given an infinite number of hours could eventually come up with a
model that generates the eight digits of pi after the decimal point as the op
timal number of shares. But the real story, of course, is about branding. The
founders, it seems, recognize that the amount of money raised in an offering
is somewhat arbitrary (at least within a range-notice that Google did not
offer 3 1 .4 million or 3. 1 million shares). Instead of picking a round number,
Google seized the moment to show the world how nerds conduct an IPO.
76. See Google Corporate Information: Company Overview, http://www.google.com/
corporate/index.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2006).
77.
Cf Top ln(eAIO) Reasons Why e Is Better Than Pi, http://www.mu.org/-doug/exp/
etoplO.htmJ (last visited Mar. 6, 2006).
78. See BATIELLE, supra note 34, at 2 1 7 ("By manipulating the actual offering to provide
this knowing wink to nerd humor, Google was in effect declaring: the geeks are in control.").
79. Word of mouth spread the math joke quickly around Wall Street. Interview with Scott
Pintoff, General Counsel, GFI Group, Inc. (Aug. 1 8, 2005).
80. Michael Kanellos, Gwyneth, the Grateful Dead and Google, ZDNET AUSTRALIA, July
28, 2003, http://www.zdnet.com.au/news/business/soa/Gwyneth_the_Grateful_Dead_and_Google/
0,39023 1 66,20276597 ,00.htm. I am indebted to Bernard Eskandari for this observation.
8 1 . Donald E. Knuth, The Future of TEX and METAFONT, http://www.ntg.nl/maps/
pdf/5_34.pdf (last visited Mar. 6, 2006). I am indebted to Paul Ohm for this observation.
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Integrity. Most search engines and Internet portals are cluttered with
links, ads, and promotions. The main Google search page, on the other hand,
is mostly white space. Other than a few barebones links and the playful "I' m
Feeling Lucky" button, the site concentrates on helping the user. The search
results page is similarly clean. There are no pop-up ads or advertising banners.
Google does not distort its search results, instead setting aside its Spon
sored Links in a separate sidebar and in a box across the top. It does not
engage in "search engine payola."82 Google's website explains,
Advertising on Google is always clearly identified as a "Sponsored Link."
It is a core value for Google that there be no compromising of the integrity
of our results. We never manipulate rankings to put our partners higher in
our search results. No one can buy better PageRank. Our users trust
Google's objectivity and no short-term gain could ever justify breaching
83
that trust.

Not all consumers care about payola as a matter of principle, but to the
extent payola distorts the search results that the algorithm would otherwise
generate, payola matters. And Google's approach is refreshing. Its consis
tency with respect to integrity issues makes PageRartk credible despite its
relative lack of transparency.84
The Auction IPO enhanced Google's brand image by solidifying its
reputation as being more concerned with integrity than insider profits. Dot
com founders became millionaires by cashing in on IPOs.85 Google's foun
ders are billionaires, but their choice of deal structure reflects little desire to
cash in quickly at the expense of long-term shareholders.
Egalitarianism. Google presents an image of being democratic and non
elitist. Google Search is freely available without a fee or even registration.
Basic versions of fancier applications like Google Maps, Google Print, and

82.
Compare Posting of Victor Fleischer to Conglomerate, http://www.theconglomerate.org/
2005/08/search_engine_p.html (Aug. 9, 2005), with Posting of Joshua W right to Conglomerate,
http://www.theconglomerate.org/2005/08/google_and_sear.html (Aug. 8, 2005). See generally
Ronald Coase, Payola in Radio and Television Broadcasting, 22 J.L. & EcoN. 269 ( 1 979).
83. Google Corporate Information: Our Philosophy, http://www.google.com/corporate/
tenthings.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2006).
84. Integrity is especially important for Google as it grows. Market research shows that a
corporate image strategy can affect corporate credibility and increase the acceptance of brand exten
sions. See KEVIN L. KELLER, STRATEGIC BRAND MANAGEMENT: BUILDING, MEASURING, AND
MANAGING BRAND EQUITY 546 (2d ed. 2003); Kevin L. Keller & David A. Aaker, The Effects of
Sequential Introduction of B rand Extensions, 29 J. MARKETING RES. 35-50 ( 1 992). A company with
an innovative corporate image is viewed as an expert in the area. Research also shows that innova
tive companies are also seen as trustworthy and likable. A brand image of credibility may be
especially important for high-tech companies, because the products themselves change quickly over
time. A leading marketing professor explains that in "a high-tech setting, trustworthiness also relates
to consumers' perceptions of the firm's longevity and staying power. With technology companies,
the president or CEO often is a key component of the brand and performs an important brand
building and communication function, in some cases as an advocate of the technology involved."
Keller, supra, at 741 .
85.
The self-satisfied greed of the era was captured in the documentary Startup.com, in
which one manager refers to himself as a "lowly millionaire," as contrasted with the company's
founders, who would become billionaires. See STARTUP.COM (Live/Artisan 200 1 ).
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Google Earth are free. Even on the revenue-producing side, Google main
tains an egalitarian bent. The cost of creating an account for Google's
AdWords service is only five dollars, and there is no minimum ad expendi.
8
ture required. 6
The prospectus materials suggest that this egalitarian image was impor
tant to Google. Consider two examples. First, the founders' letter, originally
planned to appear at the front of the prospectus, raised a predictable objec
tion from the SEC over the concern that, by departing from the standard
form, the prospectus might confuse investors. The founders felt it was worth
the battle. Second, Google fought the SEC over whether it could refer to the
founders and the CEO on a first-name basis, even as it conceded other is
sues.87 The SEC found the informality objectionable. Google ultimately won
the battle and was permitted both to include the founders' letter and to refer
to Eric, Sergey, and Larry on a first-name basis in the prospectus.
The auction pricing mechanism also played into this idealistic image.
Rather than having underwriters set the price using the traditional book
building method, investors set the price for shares over the Internet. The
voice of the people, not Wall Street insiders, set the price. The deal structure
eliminated the favoritism problems that accompany the traditional process
and gathered information in an evenhanded manner.
The press ate it up. A Wall Street Journal article, Google 's Dutch Treat,
noted the fit between the IPO and Google's business model: "In a sense, this
auction is the perfect IPO expression of Google's own business model. The
company's success has derived from its ability to democratize access to in
formation via the Internet, and its auction will likewise open its shares to a
88
wide spectrum of investors."
That sort of PR can't be bought.
Internal Branding. Internal branding is the process of ensuring that em
ployees embrace the brand and what it represents.89 Branding can have an
effect not just on customers, but on employees. Branding, in other words, is
more than marketing.90
For a company that relies on intellectual capital, internal branding is es
pecially important. 9 1 The auction structure fed into Google's nonconformist
92
style. The company calls its headquarters the Googleplex, and it is de86. Google Corporate Information:
facts.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2006).

Quick

Profile,

http://www.google.com/corporate/

87.
Verne Kopytoff, How SEC Held Search Engine 's Feet to the Fire in Its /PO Filing:
Lengthy Give-and-Take Unfolds in Letters with Regulators, S.F. CHRONICLE, Aug. 14, 2005, at B I .
88.

Editorial, Google 's Dutch Treat, WALL ST. J., May 3, 2004, at A20.

89.

See KELLER, supra note 84, at 1 56.

90.
See LYNN B . UPSHAW & EARL L. TAYLOR, THE MASTERBRAND MANDATE: THE MAN
AGEMENT STRATEGY THAT UNIFIES COMPANIES AND MULTIPLIES VALUE, at ix (2000) (noting that
branding tends to be compartmentalized as solely a marketing tool).
9 1 . NICHOLAS IND, LIVING THE BRAND: How TO TRANSFORM EVERY MEMBER OF YOUR
ORGANIZATION INTO A BRAND CHAMPION 50-80 (2d ed. 2004) (discussing the importance of values
to organizations).
92.

See BATTELLE, supra note 34, at 2 1 5.
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scribed as an open, informal space. Employees can bring their dogs to work.
Google touts its corporate culture as collegial, flexible, and collaborative.
Google's website highlights the use of rubber exercise balls as office chairs
and the hiring of Charlie Ayers, former chef to the Grateful Dead, as com
pany chef.
6. The Branding Power ofAuctions

Google is not alone in using the auction structure as a branding opportu
93
nity. Other companies that have completed auctions include redEnvelope,
Peet's, Salon.com, Overstock.com, Morningstar, and Ravenswood. The pat
tern suggests that companies that brand themselves as contrarian,
94
egalitarian, and user-oriented are more likely to conduct auc.tion IPOs. The
auction structure appears to be useful for cult brands (those seeking a de
voted customer base and quirky or counterculture brand association) and
integrity brands (companies whose business model depends on transparency
9
or trust). 5
Ravenswood Winery and Peet's Coffee and Tea are examples of cult
brands.96 Cult companies often position themselves in opposition to the
market leaders. Google is anti-Microsoft. Apple is anti-Microsoft. Whole
97
Foods and Trader Joe's are cult brands positioning themselves opposite
legacy supermarkets like Albertson's, Kroger, Safeway, and Ralph's. Peet's
Coffee and Tea is the anti-Starbucks.98 Ravenswood Winery, with its motto
"No Wimpy Wines," pushed red zinfandel and cultivates a contrarian brand
image.99 Other examples of specialty companies using an auction process to

93.
Finance scholars have noted the possibility that underpricing may enhance branding.
Evidence is mixed. Larry L. DuCharme, Shivaram Rajgopal & Stephan E. Sefcik, Lowballing for
"Pop ": The Case of Internet /PO Underpricing 5 (Jan. 200 1 ) (working paper on file with author),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=257725 (finding a strong associa
tion between media hype and underpricing, but also finding "mixed" evidence of a branding effect,
specifically finding that although underpricing is higher for business-to-consumer (B2C) firms, sales
increases post-IPO are not significantly related to the extent of underpricing).
94. A complete list is available at WR Hambrecht + Co: Auctions and Offerings, http://
www.openipo.com/ind/auctions/index.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2006).
95. See MICHAEL LEVINE, A BRANDED WORLD: ADVENTURES IN PUBLIC RELATIONS AND
THE CREATION OF SUPERBRANDS 107 (2003) (discussing "soul branding," or the notion that compa
nies that appeal to the soul will eventually dominate the market, as a growing contingency of
consumers are willing to pay a bit more for a product if it helps a worthy cause).
96.
Peet's used the auction process for a follow-on offering, not its IPO. The company went
public in 2001 , before Hambrecht had tried out the OpenIPO system.
97. W hole Foods did a traditional IPO. Other Whole Foods deals, however, reflect sensitivity
to branding concerns. For example, it refuses to accept slotting fees (the fees that retailers charge
manufacturers for product placement and shelf space).
98.
Cf AUSTIN POWERS: THE SPY WHO SHAGGED ME (New Line Cinema 1 999). Peel's,
ironically enough, was the original owner of the Starbucks brand. It started as the "Starbuck's Cof
fee Company" in 1 97 1 before acquiring Peet's Coffee and Tea in 1 984. It sold its Seattle-based
assets, including the Starbucks brand, to II Giomale coffee company in 1 987. PEET's COFFEE &
TEA, PROSPECTUS 30-3 1 (2002), available at http://www.openipo.com/tradfo/peet/200204 1 9 .pdf.
99.

Ravenswood does not go so far as to push white zin. No one is that daring.
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distribute stock include Salon.com (a nontraditional media outlet) and

redEnvelope (an online gift retailer).

Overstock.com is an example of a company that seeks a savvy, knowl
edgeable consumer base. The company is an online outlet-shopping site that
specializes in liquidating excess inventory through direct Internet sales. It

also has an online auction branch. Its founder, Patrick Byrne, reported that

he received little interest from venture capitalists and viewed the traditional
100
IPO process with skepticism. The Overstock.com website includes an un
usual letter to stockholders that stresses transparency and integrity and
'°'
explains Overstock's conservative accounting.

Morningstar is an example of an "integrity" company providing a cre

dence good to savvy consumers. Morningstar is a financial-services
company that provides services to individuals, advisors, and institutions.
The brand is one of the most recognized and respected in the investment

industry. A traditional IPO-with its associations with underpricing, favored
allocations, and insider profiteering�ould have undermined the Morning

star brand image. Morningstar emphasized its commitment to integrity in its

IPO prospectus: it noted that it would not provide guidance to analysts (be

cause of the inherent conflict it presents to management's personal financial
interest) and that it voluntarily expensed its stock options on the income
'°2

statement.

Conclusion. It is difficult to measure the effect the deal structure had on

Google's brand equity. But the evidence suggests that from a branding per

spective, the deal was successful. Google's CEO has publicly speculated
that publicity surrounding the IPO-no doubt attributable in part to the un
'°3
usual deal structure-may have boosted revenues in that quarter.
By

boosting revenues and increasing brand equity, the apparent dichotomy be

tween branding and efficiency disappears. While the auction IPO may not

have produced the maximum share price possible, it may have helped boost
revenue, which in tum supports Google's current share price.
B.

Ben & Jerry 's Homemade, Inc.

The Google IPO, while innovative, was not the first deal to blend Wall

Street finance with Main Street values. When Ben & Jerry's went public in

1984, it sold its stock directly to customers, employees, and friends, limiting

the offering to Vermont residents. Smaller companies occasionally use direct

public offerings, or DPOs, to go public. In a direct public offering, a com100.

The Charlie Rose Show (PBS Television broadcast Mar. 1 1 , 2005).

Overstock.com, CEO Letter to Owners, http://www.shareholder.com/overstock/owners.
l0 I .
cfm (last visited Feb. 23, 2006).
102.
MORNINGSTAR, PROSPECTUS FOR INITIAL PuBLIC OFFERING OF COMMON STOCK 27
(2005), available at http://www.openipo.com/ind/auctions/openipo/morn/morn20050502.pdf.
103.
Paul Kedrosky's Infectious Greed, http://paul.kedrosky.com/archives/00 1 570.html (July
2 1 , 2005) (quoting Google CEO Eric Schmidt as noting that the third quarter of 2004 was particu
larly strong for Google "because of improvements in our ability to monetize traffic and perhaps
because of the publicity surrounding our IPO approximately a year ago.").
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pany raises capital by marketing its stock directly to customers, employees,
friends, and family, without the help of an underwriter. Following the offer
ing, the stock trades over-the-counter, if at all. DPOs do double duty for the
small companies that employ them. Besides raising capital, they bond the
consumer to the company. 1 04 Ben & Jerry's coupled this direct-marketing
strategy with a rarely used exception to the securities laws for intrastate of
ferings. By selling stock directly to customers, and by limiting the
geographic distribution to Vermont, Ben & Jerry's cleverly and carefully
designed a way of raising money that, although not necessarily achieving
the lowest cost of capital, furthered other goals.
The story of how "two real guys" from Vermont opened their first scoop
shop on the site of an old gas station in Burlington, Vermont is quite farnil
iar. 1 05 Ben & Jerry's is often held out as a paragon of social responsibility. 1 06
Cynics might dismiss the Ben & Jerry's brand image as little more than a
marketing ploy; today, Ben & Jerry's is owned by Unilever, a multinational
conglomerate. But whatever the current state of the brand, it is indisputable
that for many years Ben & Jerry's made the most of their unusual, powerful
brand image. This Section explores how the deal structure the company used
back in 1984 contributed to the ubiquitous image in our minds of aging,
contented hippies eating ice cream.
1 . Vermonters-Only
Ben & Jerry's went public in 1984. The founders, Ben Cohen and Jerry
Greenfield, needed investment capital to build a new factory in Waterbury,
Vermont. The founders already saw the factory as more than a factor of pro
duction: it would be built close to the ski resort in Stowe and its attendant
tourist traffic. The company could not borrow enough money to build the
factory. They needed equity. Bankers advised the two to seek venture
capital. 107 The founders chose to do a public offering instead. In and of itself,
the decision to raise money from the public rather than venture capitalists is
1 04. Mark Kollar, Do-It-Yourself Public Offerings, INVESTMENT DEALERS' DIG., Mar. 24,
1997, at 1 5 (discussing Ben & Jerry's and other DPOs and noting that a company must have a
"built-in fan club" that wants to be a part of the business). " 'People become better customers when
they are part owners . . . . This also enhances the marketing of the product and services.' " Id. (quot
ing Drew Field, a securities lawyer in San Francisco).
1 05.
B EN COHEN & JERRY GREENFIELD, BEN & JERRY'S DOUBLE-DIP: How TO RUN A VAL
UES-LED BUSINESS AND MAKE MONEY, Too ( 1 997). The Ben & Jerry's brand image has arguably
been overplayed. Two Ben & Jerry-like characters are parodied in an episode of the Simpsons, in
which Homer encounters two hippies running a juice business. Homer concludes, "I guess the juice
business is more important than the ideals our hippie forefathers refused to go to war and die for."
The Simpsons: TV.com, D 'oh-in in the Wind Summary, http://www.tv.com/simpsons/doh-in-in-the
wind/episode/1 494/summary.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2006). The episode also pokes fun at the
founders of Nantucket Nectars, the "Juice Guys." Id. ; see also Nantucket Nectars, The Company,
http://www.juiceguys.com/thecompany.php (last visited Mar. 20, 2006).
1 06.

E.g., Ralph Nader, Legislating Corporate Ethics, 30 J . LEGIS. 1 93, 1 97 (2004).

1 07. FRED LAGER, BEN & JERRY'S: THE INSIDE Scoop 91 ( 1994) ("The bankers said Ben's
proposal to sell stock only to Vermonters was 'naive and impractical' . . . . Everyone politely sug
gested that venture capital was the way to go.").
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not so surprising; venture financing would have resulted in a substantial loss
of control, including control over the commitment to social responsibility
the founders valued so highly. What made the offering unusual was that
stock was offered directly to investors without the help of an underwriter,
and it was offered only to Vermont residents.
18
Local interest in the offering was initially scant. 0 The founders were
frustrated by the need to complete a prospectus, which was required under
state law notwithstanding the federal securities-law exemption. The foun
ders and managers patiently plugged the company in a Burlington-only
"road show" at a local hotel, night after night. The company priced the of
fering cheap, at $ 1 0.50 a share, with a minimum purchase of just twelve
shares. Demand eventually picked up, and the offering successfully closed.
The company raised enough equity capital to secure additional government
loans and grants, and they built the new factory in Waterbury. As explained
below, the company may have left money on the table by limiting the poten
tial purchasers of their stock to Vermont residents. But the offering allowed
the company to accomplish other goals: it protected the integrity and iden
tity of the company.
Ben & Jerry's Homemade did not stay a Vermont-only operation for
long. The company followed up the Vermont-only offering with a NASDAQ
offering just one year later, providing liquidity to shareholders and addi
109
tional capital to the growing company. The company continued to grow
throughout the late ' 80s and ' 90s. Its return to stockholders was mediocre,
however, and the company attracted takeover bids. Unilever, a European
food-and-consumer-goods conglomerate, acquired the company in 2000 at
$43.60 per share, nearly a 1 00% premium to the trading price. Unilever cre
ated a separate board of directors to run the company, to maintain the
company's social mission and, presumably, to hold on to the brand image
.
.
1
that se11s so many pmts o f ice cream. 1 0
2. Costs and Benefits of the Geographic Restriction
From a corporate-finance perspective, limiting the initial offering to
Vermont residents seems inefficient. Institutional investors-mutual funds,
foundations, pension funds, insurance companies--dominate the market for
IPOs. Few of these institutions are incorporated in Vermont. Individuals,
then, made up the vast majority of the buyers. Vermont has its share of

1 08. Local coverage was matter-of-fact. E.g., Ben & Jerry's Offers Stock, RUTLAND DAILY
HERALD, May 2, 1984, at 6. A former employee recollects some radio and news coverage. Email
from Ben & Jerry's Consumer Services to Jennifer Locke (Sept. l , 2005, 08:40 EST) (on file with
author).
109. Prior to the secondary offering, the company created a class of preferred stock, held by
the charitable Ben & Jerry's Foundation, that would make a takeover more difficult. Susan Young
wood, Ben and Jerry 's Stockholders Approve Common Stock Issue, BURLINGTON FREE PRESS, Oct.
26, 1985, at 7A.
1 1 0. This decision to create a separate board of directors can itself be viewed as an example
of branding affecting deal structure.
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wealthy individuals, but the geographic restriction had the foreseeable effect
of limiting demand for the stock, which very likely pushed down the price at
111
which the company was able to sell the stock. Were there non-branding
related factors that may have justified this seemingly irrational deal structure?
Regulatory-cost engineering. From a transaction-cost engineering per
spective, the geographic restriction makes little sense. From a regulatory
perspective, however, the structure had a few advantages. Federal securities
laws normally require a company offering securities to the public to file
documents with the SEC and distribute materials to prospective investors.
The Securities Act of 1933, however, has a narrow exemption for intrastate
1 12
offerings. The exemption does not render the securities law irrelevant; it
only relieves issuers of the obligation to register the offering and deliver a
1 14
113
prospectus. Antifraud provisions still apply to intrastate offerings. And
Vermont laws protecting investors still applied to the transaction. As a re
sult, Ben & Jerry's had to prepare an offering circular and prospectus. But it
did not have to prepare audited financial statements going back in time,
115
which would have been difficult for the disorganized company.
Avoiding federal registration produced some cost savings to Ben &
Jerry's. "By not having to deal with the SEC," wrote Fred Lager, the com
pany's General Manager, "we'd be able to save the tens of thousands of
dollars in legal and accounting fees that would have been necessary in order
to comply with the stricter securities laws that applied to any offering that
1 16
crossed state lines."
The savings from reduced paperwork, however, may not have been
worth the tradeoff, at least if one disregards the branding implications of the
structure. By Fred Lager's possibly generous estimate, the company saved
tens of thousands of dollars in legal and accounting fees. But this amount
was likely offset by the additional money the company could have raised
had they looked to non-Vermont residents. If, for example, by offering the
stock nationally, the company had sold the stock at $ 1 1 .50 instead of $ 10.50
per share, it would have raised an additional $73,500, presumably more than

l 1 1.

This is actually a tricky point if resale out of state is permitted.

1 1 2.
Securities Act of 1933 § 3(a)( l l ), 1 5 U S C. § 77(c)(a)( l l) (2000); LoUis Loss & JOEL
SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 377-87 (5th ed. 2004) (discussing intra
state offering exemption). See generally Daniel J. McCauley, Jr., Intrastate Securities Transactions
under the Federal Securities Act, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 937 ( 1 959).
.

1 13.

McCauley, supra note 1 1 2, at 939.

1 1 4.

Id. at 955-59.

.

1 15 .
LAGER, supra note 107, a t 9 3 ("A fully registered offering would also have required
audited financial statements going back three years, which was something we didn't have.").
1 1 6.

Id.
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1 17
offsetting the regulatory savings. Reducing the company's cost of capital,
1 18
however, did not seem to be the goal of the offering.
Bonding with customers by making them investors. The founders wanted
to strengthen the bond between the company and its local clientele and
1 19
community. Although the company had started to sell ice cream outside
the state, most of its sales still came from Vermonters. Offering stock to
Vermonters first was a way to underscore the company's early supporters.
According to Lager, "[Ben's] conviction was that we were holding the busi
ness in trust, and that we should give the people who had supported the
company from its earliest days the first opportunity to profit from our suc
12
cess." 0 The small minimum investment of just twelve shares, or $ 1 26,
121
reflects this goal.
"We wanted to make it available to all economic
122
classes," Cohen told Inc. magazine in a 1 989 interview. "We were seeking
123
somewhat to redistribute wealth."
Ben's statement about redistributing wealth reflects a nai've view of in
vesting. Access to an IPO does not necessarily redistribute wealth. An IPO
is not a money machine. If the company had failed, access to the IPO would
have cost Vermonters, not helped them. Offering stock to Vermonters re
flects Ben's optimism, however. Vermonters who bought the stock did well
for themselves. A share of stock purchased in 1 984 for $ 1 0.50 would have
124
been sold in 2000 to Unilever for $39 1 , adjusting for stock splits.
Ben's lack of sophistication regarding investment risk should not be con
fused with poor business judgment. Although going public created fiduciary
duties to his new shareholders, Ben believed it could be a two-way street.
Shareholders could work for him. The idea "was for the company to be
owned by the same people who had lined up for scoops of ice cream at the

1 1 7. BEN & JERRY'S HOMEMADE, INC., PROSPECTUS 1 (May 1 , 1 984) (on file with author)
(showing number of shares offered at 73,500, with price to public at $ 10.50).
1 1 8. LAGER, supra note 107, at 1 00 ("Our offering was directed at people who had never
invested in stocks before. Most tombstones appear in the financial section. We were placing ours
with the movie and TV listings.").
1 1 9. Terry Minsky, The Entrepreneur: Scooping Up Cold Cash, ESQUIRE, March 1985, at 58
(''The company went public last year, but Ben and Jerry have sold their stock only to residents of
Vermont, as a way of thanking them for their help."); Gail Perrin, A Solid Success in Ice Cream,
BOSTON GLOBE, May 30, 1984, at 46 ("The company began offering shares to Vermont residents
May I . Ben emphasizes he made this decision 'because I really believe business has a responsibility
to give back to the community.' ").
120.

LAGER, supra note 107, at 90.

121.

Ben & Jerry's Prospectus, supra note 1 1 7, at 25.

1 22. Erik Larson, Forever Young: Ben and Jerry 's Quest to Keep Their Company's Spirit Alive
as the Business Grows, INC., July 1988, at 50 (quoting Ben Cohen).
123. Id. at 52 (quoting Ben Cohen). It is not self-evident, of course, that allowing Vermonters
to purchase the stock necessarily redistributes wealth. Offering the stock only redistributes wealth if
the insiders know that the company is worth more than the offering price per share; it seems likely
that Cohen believed this, but could not know it for sure.
1 24.
Basis in the original shares was reduced to $ 1 . 1 7 by splits. Ben & Jerry's, Public Capi
talization and Stock Split History, http://www.benjerry.com/our_company/research_library/financial
_info/index.cfm#sec3 (last visited Mar. 5, 2006).
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125
gas station." Customer-stockholders could add value in a way that faceless
126
stockholders would not. Potential stockholders were given ice cream at the
121
road show. The company also targeted the 1 985 secondary offering to cus
tomers rather than institutional investors, although the offering was not
limited to Vermont residents. The underwriter explained to a Vermont news
paper, " 'We told Ben (Cohen, president and founder of Ben & Jerry's) that
customers of Ben & Jerry's will have equal preference as customers of [the
128
underwriter] .' " Observers estimated that by the mid- 1980s, one percent of
129
Vermont residents owned stock in the company.
Still, the value added by having stockholders harangue their local Kwik
E-Mart owners seems rather slim. Because each individual shareholder
owned such a small percentage of the company, each one would have had
little economic incentive to engage in the sort of watchdog behavior Ben
touted. Perhaps some of this behavior occurred, especially in Burlington.
But the real value of the intrastate offering wasn't local. It was global.
Branding. The unusual deal structure gave Cohen a chance to talk about
the company with the business press, not just when the offering occurred in
1 984, but for years afterwards. In interviews, Cohen highlighted the com
munity-oriented nature of the company, and, much like Google, he stressed
the founders' willingness to act independently from Wall Street. 130 The
company ran advertisements in Vermont newspapers that read "Get a Scoop

1 25.

LAGER, supra note

1 26.

Lager explains:

107, at 9 1 .

Ben wanted the minimum investment to be $ 125. The investment bankers we'd talked to
thought that lots of small stockholders would be an unnecessary financial burden, owing to the
administrative costs. Ben saw advantages in having lots of shareholders. Like us, they could
straighten out the pints in the supermarket freezers and bug the frozen-food clerk when the
store didn't have Heath Bar Crunch in stock.

Id.

1 27.

Id. at I O I ("The meetings would run about two hours, beginning with presentations from

Ben and me and ending with a question-and-answer period during which we scooped ice cream. The
ice cream freezer that we hauled around with us for the meetings was always prominently placed in
the front of the room, to entice those who came to stay to the end.").

1 28.
Susan Youngwood, Ben & Jerry's Offers More Stock, BURLINGTON FREE PRESS, Sept. 1 8,
1 985, at 4B (quoting Ned Morris, vice president at Tucker Anthony & R.L. Day Inc., the brokerage
firm underwriting the offering). Friends of Phish Food, not Friends of Frank, had dibs.

1 29. E.g., Lewis D. Solomon, On the Frontier of Capitalism: Implementation of Humanomics
by Modem Publicly Held Corporations: A Critical Assessment, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1625,
1 638 ( 1 993).
1 30.

Bruce Posner writes:

By "Vermonters," moreover, Cohen did not mean a few well-heeled vacationers from New
York and Boston. Quite the contrary. "We're very community-oriented," he says, "and I
wanted to give typical Vermonters a chance to participate." So Cohen and his attorney ap
proached the local offices of several regional and national underwriters to discuss the prospect
of a $600 ,000 public equity offering for Vermont residents only. While some of the underwrit
ers seemed intrigued, "nobody wanted to do an intrastate offering," reports Cohen. "Nor were
they willing to do anything that small."
Bruce

G. Posner, A Scoop ofthe Action, INC., July 1984, at 1 23 .
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131
In
of the Action," inviting readers to request a copy of the prospectus.
deed, some investors appeared to buy the stock as more of a memento than
132
an investment.
For some holders, Ben & Jerry's stock was somewhat
133
analogous to owning stock in the Green Bay Packers. The cult of Ben &
Jerry's was being built, stock certificate by stock certificate.
The cult of Ben & Jerry's spread. The new factory lured the tourist
1 34
trade.
"What better way to reinforce the image of 'Vermont's Finest,' "
Lager explained, "than to offer people a taste of fresh ice cream right off the
135
production line, in the shadow of the Green Mountains?" The factory was
not an accidental tourist attraction; it was designed with precisely that goal
in mind. The prospectus explained, ''The Company intends to organize plant
136
tours ending in the Company's retail facility." The deal, as Calvin Trillin
later noted, financed the plant "through a scheme that was well attuned to
137
Ben & Jerry's style."
The IPO was not the only time Ben & Jerry exploited the branding im
plications of legal events. The first time involved its chief super-premium
ice cream competitor, Haagen-Dazs. Haagen-Dazs, despite the Scandinavian
name, was an American company. Haagen-Dazs was founded by hardwork
ing entrepreneur Reuben Mattus, and Pillsbury acquired the company in
138
1983.
In the early 1 980s, Ben & Jerry's sued Haagen-Dazs concerning
distribution to retailers. Seizing on the opportUnity to enhance its brand im
age as a counterculture company, Ben & Jerry's played up its underdog
status. They gave away T-shirts and bumper stickers that poked fun at the
Pillsbury trademark. The shirts asked, "WHAT'S THE DOUGHBOY
140
AFRAID OF?" 139 They took out classified ads in Rolling Stone magazine.
The company ran ten-second late-night television commercials in the New
York area. Cohen told the New York Times, "We say, 'We might not be able
131.

Id.

About a third of the investors purchased the minimum amount of shares, and a large
1 32.
number of shares were purchased by people in trust for their children or grandchildren. LAGER,
supra note 107, at 103.
1 33.
Purchasers of Green Bay Packers common stock own a security that resembles common
stock only in the most formal sense of the word. They cannot sell the stock or redeem the stock, nor
are they entitled to dividends or proceeds on liquidation, nor do they have any meaningful voting
rights. The stock is intended, in other words, to sit on the mantle and be passed down from one
generation of Packers fans to the next. See generally Philip D. Drake & Mark D. Griffiths, Green
Bay Packers, Inc., http://www.thunderbird.edu/pdf/about_us/case_series/a06980004.pdf (last visited
Mar. 20, 2006).
Will Lindner, Ben & Jerry's Stock Offering is Complete, RUTLAND DAILY HERALD, July
1 34.
4, 1984, at 7 (''The company hopes to build the 25,000-square-foot facility to increase production
and lure the tourist trade.").
1 35.

LAGER, supra note 107, at 94.

1 36.

Ben & Jerry's Prospectus, supra note 1 1 7, at 6.

1 37.

Calvin Trillin, American Chronicles: Competitors, NEW YORKER, July 8, 1 985, at 43.

Haagen-Dazs, Company History, http://www.haagen-dazs.com/coibrh.do (last visited
1 38.
Mar. 20, 2006).
1 39.

Charles P. Alexander, A Stock Scoop for lee Cream, TIME, Nov. 4, 1 985, at 59.

140.

Trillin, supra note 1 37, at 3 1 .
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to afford a 30-second commercial but we sure make good ice cream.' And
their battle with Hiiagen-Dazs, he added, shows that 'we can stand up to the
141
big guys.' " The Times, of course, helped out by printing a story about the
dispute.
142
The antitrust claim was settled out of court. A marketing professor de
scribed Ben & Jerry's image as appealing to the "Reformed Hippy"
143
market. Calvin Trillin, writing in the New Yorker, explained that the geo
graphical connection Ben & Jerry's tried to project "was not with the
capitals of Europe but with rural Vermont." Trillin explains, "Times had
changed. For the generation Ben and Jerry belonged to, the Continent had
lost its cachet. Cachet had lost its cachet. Cohen and Greenfield were inter
ested not simply in using natural ingredients but in being natural
144
themselves."
By casting Hiiagen-Dazs as a villain, the campaign drew thousands of
145
supporters and garnished substantial attention in the press. The campaign
had a serious side; the founders enlisted the white-shoe Boston firm of
Ropes & Gray to pursue what they believed was a genuine antitrust viola
146
tion. Ben Cohen acknowledged, however, that he saw the campaign both
as an attempt to expose corporate bullying and as publicity that might result
147
in some ice-cream sales. Hiiagen-Dazs's founder, meanwhile, viewed the
campaign as an irritating but effective publicity stunt to avoid the hard work
of elbowing one's way into a national market, as he had done himself as an
entrepreneur. Trillin reported: " ' They got P.R. and exposure they couldn't
buy for millions,' [Mattus] has said. 'What they did in a couple of years took
148
me eighteen years to do. I did it the hard way.' "
3. A Scoop of the Action: Epilogue
Ben & Jerry's deal gimmicks would pay dividends for years to come.
Ben & Jerry's first placed stock in the same hands as consumers who ate the
149
ice cream. And when they succeeded, they both bonded with their current

141.

Vermont's Ice Cream Upstart, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1 985, at D I .

1 42.

Id.

1 43 . Id. (quoting Dr. Meryl Gardner, assistant professor o f Marketing at NYU). Not all o f the
media was eating the ice cream; one article in Forbes referred to the "sugar-laden, cholesterolly
toxic products" as "yuppie porn," noting that the product is far more popular with "men in red sus
penders" than inner-city residents, who would "need a bridge loan to take home a pint." Joe
Queenan, Purveying Yuppie Porn, FORBES, Nov. 13, 1 989, at 60.
144.

Trillin, supra note 137, at 4 1 .

145. Id. at 44 (citing a typical Jetter to Pillsbury as beginning, "CORPORATIONS LIKE
YOURS REALLY MAKE ME SICK!").
146.

Id. at 45.

147.

Id.

148.

Id. (quoting Reuben Mattus).

149.

Wendy Cooper writes:
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customers and established a pattern for dealing with the company's financial
15
issues. 0 A year later, when the company raised more funds through a more
traditional secondary offering, they placed a "Scoop up our Stock" message
on ice cream cartons, directing customers to a toll-free number to request a
151
prospectus. The unusual marketing drew attention from the press; in those
152
interviews, the founders stressed the company's charitable work. The fun
would continue well into the 1 990s, whether it was picking ice cream fla
vors or recruiting a CEO.
Unilever, the current owner of the Ben & Jerry's brand, is a far cry from
"two real guys" from Vermont. It is a multinational food-and-consumer
products conglomerate, the world's second-largest food company and, ac
cording to Professor Douglas Branson, illustrative of the challenge facing
153
corporate social responsibility in an international context.
But through
careful brand management, the Ben & Jerry's brand has largely survived.
The mythology is powerful. The Vermont-only offering, while it left some
money on the table, contributed to the cult. It was a wise investment.
*

*

*

Lawyers played a role in this production of the Ben & Jerry's cult, but
not always a particularly constructive one. Lawyers fought the founders'
urge to take the company public, and they fought the founders over the pro
duction of information in the offering circular. Lager reports an interaction
between the lawyers and the founders that will sound familiar to both:
Ben [Cohen] and Allen [Martin, issuer's counsel] were approaching the
circular from different perspectives. To the lawyers it was a disclosure
document, intended to protect us from any suggestion of misleading inves
tors in the event things didn't work out as well as we had projected. To Ben

"The people we wanted to own our stock were the people eating our ice cream," explains Fred
Lager, Ben & Jerry's general manager. Hence the direct pitch, which company co-founders
Ben Cohen and Jerry Greenfield reinforced during the week before the offering by standing on
Wall Street in blue jeans and T-shirts handing out free ice cream cones.
Wendy Cooper, Investor Relations: Gimmicks, 1986, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Apr. 1986, at 83.
150. See Jim Schembari, Investors Bet Ben & Jerry 's ls Cream of Crop, CHI. SuN-TIMES,
Nov. 1 0, 1985, at 4 (reporting on 1985 NASDAQ IPO, and quoting an underwriter as saying, "Half
the issue eat the ice cream . . . . Virtually no institutions bought the stock.").
151.

Alexander, supra note 1 39, at 59.

1 52. Ice Cream Stock All Gone, BURLINGTON FREE PRESS, Nov. 7, 1985, at SC. Like Google,
Ben & Jerry's marketing antics drew attention from the SEC. For the 1985 secondary offering, in
addition to the "Scoop Up Our Stock" advertisements on ice cream cartons, Cohen's interview with
1ime was published just two days before the offering became effective. The SEC investigated the
offering but declined to comment on its findings. Junius Ellis, Why Initial Public Offerings Are Bad
Bets, MONEY, April 1986, at 1 75.
1 53 . Douglas M. Branson, The Social Responsibility of Large Multinational Corporations, 16
TRANSNAT'L LAW. 121, 1 29-30 (2002).
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i t was a selling tool that h e was going to have to rely o n to persuade people
154
to buy the stock.

By the time Google tangled with the SEC twenty years later, its lawyers
seemed much better attuned to the branding implications of the deal. Not
only did its lawyers recognize the Google prospectus as a selling tool to in
vestors, they recognized its value as a selling tool to consumers.
But perhaps what was most remarkable about the Ben & Jerry's 1 984
stock offering had nothing to do with corporate finance. What makes it re
markable is what it did for dessert. By inviting the consumer to participate
in corporate-governance issues, Ben & Jerry's changed the nature of buying
155
ice cream.
•

C. Apple
IPOs are not the only branding opportunities for companies. I tum now
to executive compensation, and the contract between an unusual company,
Apple, and its CEO, Steve Jobs.
1 . One Dollar
Steve Jobs and Steven Wozniak founded Apple Computer in the late
1 970s. The Apple II computer became widely popular in the late 1 970s; by
1 980 the company had several thousand employees. Jobs focused his atten
tion on the user-friendly Macintosh computer, which was released in 1 984.
During the third quarter of the Super Bowl that year, Apple aired a sixty
56
second commercial introducing the Macintosh. 1 The commercial, directed
by Ridley Scott (who had recently finished Blade Runner), depicted the Or
wellian IBM world shattered by the new, friendly Mac. Apple's brand image
was established. Jobs left the company in 1 985 over strategic disagreements
with the company's CEO. Apple then struggled for years.

1 54. LAGER, supra note 107, at 97-98; see also id. at 98 (noting that in a prior case dealing
with a dispute over distribution of the ice cream, "Ben had deferred to his lawyer's advice. This time
around, he wasn't willing to assume that the 'experts' knew everything and that his input wasn't of
equal value.").

1 55. One scholar has gone so far as to call Ben & Jerry's the first postmodern ice cream cone.
Referring specifically to the marketing of Ben & Jerry's Rainforest Crunch ice cream as an attempt
to save the Amazon Rainforest, she explains:
This uncanny meshing of an urgent politics, accompanied in Brazil by assassinations, class
struggle, and the political discourse of those very meta-narratives Lyotard claims are now lost,
is translated at our end into, on the one hand, a truly helpful gesture of creating a market for
indigenous rainforest products instead of burning the jungle down for short-term cattle raising
ventures, but on the other a product which relies on all the marketing networks, advertising and
image construction, paper products and packaging, mass market supermarket distribution, ag
ribusiness-supplied milk and corporate, international sugar resources, etc., to construct this
genuinely postmodern ice cream cone.
Jennifer Wicke, Postmodern Identity and the Legal Subject, 62 U. Cow. L. REV. 455, 472 ( 199 1 ).

1 56.

Apple Company History: 1 983-1985, http://www.apple-history.com (follow "Company

History" hyperlink; then follow " 1 983- 1985" hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 20, 2006).

1616

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 104: 1 5 8 1

Jobs returned to Apple in 1 997. Since then, he has led the company to
enormous successes both in the product markets and in the eyes of the capi
tal markets. Apple shareholders received a mediocre 4.2% return from
157
1 984-1997; in contrast, they earned a 38.8% return from 1997-2004. In
return for this spectacular performance, Jobs has asked for a cash salary of
exactly one dollar a year.
No one pretends that this is the only remuneration Jobs receives. He re
ceived options when he formally accepted the CEO job in 2000. And not
just a few options: his options to acquire 1 0,000,000 shares were valued in
158
2000 at more than $240 million.
He voluntarily canceled these options,
after they were in-the-money, in exchange for restricted stock. He also al
159
lowed the company to buy him a private jet. Still, Jobs 's refusal to accept
more than a token cash salary, at the very least, is unusual.
2. The Executive-Compensation Image Problem
Public-company CEOs are overpaid. American CEOs make vastly more
money than their European and Japanese counterparts. The sheer size of
many executive compensation contracts is impressive. After Michael Ovitz
was fired from Disney, he received a severance package of $ 1 40 million,
which struck both shareholders and the general public as wasteful. Richard
Grasso, the former head of the New York Stock Exchange, received a pay
package totaling $ 1 87 million. Public outrage has swelled at the contrast
between the well-paid CEOs and their struggling companies, some of which
have been mired in accounting scandals.
For most scholars, however, the more significant problem is not the size
of compensation but its form. The link between pay and performance is
weak. In a widely-discussed book, Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried argue
that executive-compensation contracts are not the product of arms-length
160
efficient bargaining. Rather, the contracts become vehicles for managerial
rent-seeking. Bebchuk, Fried, and tax scholar David Walker have pointed
out the various ways in which executive pay camouflages managerial rent
161
seeking. Steve Bainbridge and others disagree, arguing that the contracts
162
properly align incentives. Jeffrey Gordon argues that the problem might be

1 57.
From January I , 1 985 to January I , 1 997, the stock price rose (adjusted for splits and
dividends) from $3. 1 8 to $5.22. From January I , 1 997 to January 29, 2006, the stock price rose
(adjusted for splits and dividends) from $5.22 to $72.03. Yahoo ! Finance, http://finance.yahoo.com
(last visited Jan. 29, 2006).
1 58.

STEVEN BALSAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 62 (2002).

1 59.
Balsam characterizes this as the second-largest short-term bonus paid to an executive,
ever. Id. at I 03--05.
1 60.
LUCIAN B EBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED
PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2004).
1 6 1 . See Lucian Ayre Bebchuk, Jesse N. Fried & David I. Walker, Managerial Power and
Rent Extraction in the Design ofExecutive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 75 1 (2002).
1 62. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Executive Compensation: Who Decides ?, 83 Tux. L. REV. 1 6 1 5
(2005); John E. Core, Wayne R. Guay & Randall S . Thomas, ls U.S. CEO Compensation Inefficient

June 2006]

Brand New Deal

1617

163
best addressed through improved disclosure. Whatever the extent of the
pay-performance gap, one thing is clear. Executive compensation contracts,
like IPOs, have an image problem.
Jobs's salary is an effective way of addressing this image problem. Be
fore rushing to the conclusion that Jobs's salary is just about image,
however, it is worth considering other possibilities. The structure of the
deal-all equity, no cash-is arguably efficient. It makes some sense from
the point of view of aligning incentives. Giving stock to executives roughly
aligns their interests with those of long-term shareholders. Cash, on the
other hand, feeds managerial risk aversion. Offering cash, moreover, is often
tax-inefficient. It requires some explanation to understand why executives
routinely demand cash in addition to equity.
Some amount of cash is normally considered efficient from the point of
164
view of both the company and the executive. Executives have recurring
expenses like mortgage payments and tuition payments for their kids. Al
though it is often possible to borrow against the equity portion of their
salary, borrowing costs are not trivial. Cash eases executives' liquidity con
cerns, and executives are willing to accept smaller pay packages in return.
Offering executives some amount of cash also reduces the risk premium
and thus may reduce the total amount of compensation paid to the executive.
165
Most academics believe that executives are generally risk averse.
If a
company offered compensation only in the form of equity rather than cash,
its executives would demand a higher risk premium. The risk premium
might exceed any expected gain from aligning incentives. 166 The optimal
form of compensation, then, is presumed to be a mix of cash and equity.
It is possible that Jobs has enough wealth and adequate liquidity that he
prefers to take compensation in the form of equity alone. Indeed, because
Jobs became wealthy in the 1 980s, much of his wealth may now be held in
the form of income-generating assets, easing any possible liquidity con
cerns. But from any traditional academic perspective, Jobs's cash salary of
one dollar is difficult to explain. Why one dollar, and not zero? Why not
$ 1 00,000? Why not a negative number-requiring Jobs to spend his own
Pixar-generated cash to buy more stock in the company? The choice of one
dollar is best explained by its branding effects. (If the company had better
foresight, it might have set his salary at ninety-nine cents-the cost of a
download from iTunes.)
Pay Without Peiformance? (Vanderbilt Univ. Law Sch. Law & Econ. Working Paper Series, No. 0505, 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=648648.

1 63. Jeffrey N. Gordon, Executive Compensation: If There 's a Problem, What's the Remedy ?
The Case for 'Compensation Disclosure and Analysis ', (Columbia Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal
Theory Working Paper Group, No. 0590, 2005), available at http:tnsr.nellco.org/columbia/
pllt/papers/0590.
164.

Victor Fleischer, The Missing Preferred Return, J. CORP L. (forthcoming 2006).

165. On the risks of using risk aversion as an explanation, see Victor P. Goldberg, Aversion to
Risk Aversion in the New Institutional Economics, 146 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL EcoN.
2 1 6 ( 1 990).
1 66.

Iman Anabtawi, Tournament Theory (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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It is also possible that Jobs is simply an altruistic man. As discussed in
more detail below, he does not appear to be driven primarily by economic
self-interest. But declining cash salary would be an odd way of expressing
altruism. It is difficult to know if the benefits of his denying himself cash
salary ultimately benefit shareholders, creditors, or customers. If Jobs's goal
were simply altruistic, he would be better advised to accept the cash and
167
make a tax-deductible donation to the charity of his choice.

3. "One Dollar"
Whatever Jobs's motivation, the branding effects of the structure of
Jobs's salary are powerful. The gesture is especially powerful because it fits
so nicely with the existing Apple brand. Apple has developed and cultivated
a following among its consumers in a way that Microsoft, Dell, Intel, and
other computer-related companies have not. People love their Macs. Despite
the market dominance of PCs, Mac users stubbornly hold on to their Macs,
sometimes forming user groups to help each other out. People try to convert
others to Apple products. And iPods have become a cultural icon of their
own. Apple has some of the hallmarks of not just a well-run company, but a
religion.
Steve Jobs, as the founder, savior, and leader of Apple, anchors this be
lief system. His salary reflects his commitment to integrity. It confirms his
desire to do the job for reasons other than money alone. Blogger Hadley
Stem explained in his blog post, "One Dollar is Why We Love Apple":
A buck.
This is why we love Apple. Because inherent in this salary is an ethos of
doing things differently and better. Take any old Fortune

500 executive and

they would insist on a huge salary with a bevy of options thrown in. Not

1 67.

In

an

interview, Jobs explained the decision as follows:

INTERVIEWER: You've finally done away with the word "interim" in your title. But you still
only let Apple pay you $1 a year. Why don't you take any salary or stock yet?
Joas: The board has made several incredibly generous offers. I have turned them all down for a
few reasons. For the first year I did not want the shareholders and employees of Pixar to think
their CEO was going on a camping trip over to Apple never to return. After two and a half
years, I think that the management teams at Pixar and at Apple have demonstrated that we can
handle this situation. That's why I dropped the "interim" from my title. I ' m still called iCEO,
though, because I think it's cool.
Bottom line is, I didn't return to Apple to make a fortune. I've been very lucky in my life an
already have one. When I was 25, my net worth was $100 million or so. I decided then that I
wasn't going to let it ruin my life. There's no way you could ever spend it all, and I don't view
wealth as something that validates my intelligence. I just wanted to see if we could work to
gether to turn this thing around when the company was literally on the verge of bankruptcy.
The decision to go without pay has served me well.
Steve Jobs, Apple 's One-Dollar-A- Year Man,

FORTUNE, Jan. 24, 2000, at 76.
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Steve. In the age of Enron and Worldcom this is a refreshing thing in
168

deed.

Stem's language is telling. He addresses an audience presumed to share
his values: "We," not "I." And we "love" Apple, we do not just admire or
respect it. He recognizes the Apple ethos of doing things "differently"echoing Apple's ad campaign admonishing the public to "Think Different."
He assumes a sense of familiarity and shared space with Jobs, whom he re
169
fers to as Steve, not Jobs. The blogger continues:
Of course, Steve Jobs is not a poor man. His wealth is counted in the bil
lions. But it is rare for someone to run a company and not get paid a huge
salary. And he isn't doing it for the power. He is doing it for the love of
creating beautiful pieces of technology. The cult of the Mac can be traced
directly to this spirit. Whether it is Steve Jobs obsessing over the details of
the original Mac calculator, or over the interface of the iPod, the love is
there. He wants to do the right thing and is passionate about it.
We see this passion in the products and as Apple users become imbued
with it . . . . This is why there is the Mac web. Ever heard of the Dell web?
110
Or the Windows web? I haven't. And it all goes back to that salary.

This relationship with consumers-the cult of the Mac-is exactly in tune
with Apple's brand. Through the iPod, Apple is extending the cult of the
.
171
Mac mto new products and revenue streams.
I do not mean to suggest that Jobs is motivated solely or even principally
by marketing concerns. By all accounts, Jobs is a generous, socially con
scious person. When a New York City teenager was killed on his way to the
subway by thieves demanding his iPod, Jobs called the family to offer his
condolences and offer help. (This was not a calculated PR move; the family,
172
not Apple, spoke to the press about the phone call.)
Jobs's touching
graduation speech at Stanford this year reflects his inspiring, contrarian ap
proach. The speech, which admonished graduates to "Stay hungry, stay
173
foolish," was widely distributed by email. But however pure Jobs's moti
vation, his salary structure has marketing effects. His acceptance of a dollar
is symbolic, but symbolism is not the same thing as an empty gesture. It is
part of the company's formation of an identity.

168. Apple Matters, One Dollar Is Why We Love Apple, http://applematters.com/index.php/
section/comments/one_dollar_is_why_we_love_apple/ (last visited Mar. 20, 2006).
169.

Bill Gates, in contrast, is rarely referred to as Bill, even on biogs.

170.

Id.

1 7 1 . See also STEVEN LEVY, INSANELY GREAT: THE LIFE AND TIMES O F MACINTOSH, THE
COMPUTER THAT CHANGED EVERYTHING (2000).
1 72. Jobs Calls Family of Stabbing Victim, CNNMONEY.COM, July 6, 2005, http://
money.cnn.com/2005/07/06/news/newsmakers/stevejobs_ipod.
1 73. Steven Jobs, Commencement Address at Stanford University (June 12, 2005), available
at http://news-service.stanford.edu/news/2005/j une l 5/jobs-061 505 .html.
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By now the reader may not be surprised to learn that Google and Ben &
Jerry's, like Apple, also have unusual executive-compensation contracts. In
2005 the Google founders and the CEO all agreed to take a cash salary of
174
one dollar. The founders are worth more than $7 billion each on paper and
have sold substantial stakes in the IPO and secondary market. The gesture is
175
symbolic. But the symbolism matters.
Ben & Jerry's restrictions on compensation were more than symbolic
and arguably hampered the company's ability to find talented executives. At
the time of the IPO, no officer or director received aggregate remuneration
in excess of $30,000, and all directors and officers received a combined
176
compensation of $56,440. For some years following, Ben & Jerry's had a
"five-to-one salary ratio," limiting the top salary at the company to five
177
times that of the lowest-paid employee. The company managed to tum this
challenge into a branding opportunity.
Consider the company's search for a CFO in 1 989. The five-to-one sal
ary structure limited the salary to $75,000 at a time when comparable CFOs
earned $ 1 25 ,000 to $300,000. A New York Times story entitled "Wntd:
C.F.O. With 'Flair for Funk' " explained, "The company got the idea that the
search might take a while when it heard that some of the applicants, while
178
they were being interviewed, found it hard to keep from giggling." Again,
179
the search generated some brand-positive publicity. Indeed, some of the
"difficulties" in finding a CFO seem a little contrived. Search methods in
18
cluded ads in Mother Jones, the Nation, the Utne Reader, and New Age. 0
While such ads might find left-leaning CFOs who would value the psychic
income from working at Ben & Jerry's, the ads may have been more about
selling ice cream to left-leaning readers than about efficiently locating a
suitable executive.

1 74.
Paul R. La Monica, Google Chiefs Agree to Work for $/, CNNMoNEY.COM, Apr. 8,
2005, http://money.cnn.com/2005/04/08/technology/google_salary.
1 75 . See BALSAM, supra note 158, at 62, 63. Balsam reports other examples of executives
forgoing salary, including the CEOs or Chairmen of Capital One Financial, El Paso Energy, Viacom,
PepsiCo, and Borders. The Pepsi proxy statement explained:
At [Chairman and CEO Roger] Enrico's request, the Committee again approved a reduction

Mr. Enrico's

annual salary from

$900,000

to

$1,

in

and recommended to the Board of Directors

that it consider using the savings to support front line employees. Jn January
approved annual charitable contributions of approximately $ 1 ,000,000 to

1999,
fund

the Board
additional

scholarships for children of PepsiCo's front line employees.
Id. at 63.

1 76.

Ben & Jerry's Prospectus, supra note 1 1 7,

at

20.

1 77. Erik Larson, Forever Young: Ben and Jerry 's Quest to Keep Their Company's Spirit Alive
as the Business Grows, lNc., July 1988, at 50; see also id. at 57-58 (discussing internal company
debate over whether to keep the policy, which "makes recruiting difficult").
1 78.

N.R. Kleinfeld, Wntd: C.F.O. With "Flairfor Funk," N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 1 989, § 3, at 4.

1 79.

Solomon, supra note 129, at 1660; Kleinfeld, supra note 1 78, at 4.

1 80.

Kleinfeld, supra note 1 78, at 4.
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Ben & Jerry's turned the salary restriction into an even more explicit
branding opportunity with its gimmicky "Yo! I'm Your CEO ! " search in
1
1994. 8 1 The contest attracted thousands of mostly ridiculous applications;
the company ultimately turned to a search firm and hired a former
McKinsey partner to run the company.
Google, Ben & Jerry's, and Apple have different customer bases and
company values. One thing they have in common is a commitment to execu
tive

integrity

and

a

contrarian

brand

image,

and

their

executive

compensation policies reinforce that image.

D. Stanley Works
The first three case studies illustrate how companies can use deal struc
ture to build brand equity. The Stanley Works story illustrates how
executives can squander it.
In February

2002, Stanley Works announced plans to undergo a "corpo

rate inversion"-that is, it planned to expatriate from the United States and
reincorporate in the tax haven of Bermuda. Inversion deals are little more
than a shuffling of corporate papers with the aim of lowering a corporation's
long-term U.S. tax liability. An inversion is different from outsourcing, both
conceptually and substantively. It does not require any substantive change in
the company's operations, such as a relocation of factories, employees, or
even corporate headquarters. It is a strategy driven by regulatory-cost engi
neering. From a corporate-finance perspective-both

as

a

matter of

transaction-cost engineering and regulatory-cost engineering-it is perfectly
rational and sensible for a company like Stanley Works to reincorporate in
2
Bermuda. 18 The puzzle is not why inversion deals take place, but rather why
3
we see so few. 1 8 B randing may be part of the answer.

1 . An All-American Company
Stanley Works is a Connecticut-based tool manufacturer. Stanley tools
are among the most recognized tools in the United States; its carpentry, gar
den, and masonry tools can be found in most American garages or
toolsheds. Stanley's door products, which span everything from simple door

1 8 1 . Ben & Jerry's Timeline, http://www.benjerry.com/our_company/about_us/our_history/
timeline/index.cfm (last visited Mar. 20, 2006).
1 82. One potential drawback is the loss of the Delaware laws and courts; under the internal
affairs doctrine, corporate governance matters will be governed by the laws of the state (or country)
of incorporation.
1 83. The leading economic analysis of inversion deals is Mihir A. Desai & James R. Hines,
Jr., Expectations and Expatriations: Tracing the Causes and Consequences of Corporate Inversions
55 NAT'L TAX J. 409 (2002). The authors conclude that market response to inversion announce
ments reflects not just an anticipation of a reduction of U.S. tax liability on foreign source income,
but also an expectation of a reduction in U.S. tax liability on U.S. source income through techniques
such as earnings stripping, in which the inverted corporation receives tax-deductible interest pay
ments from its U.S. subsidiary. Their paper identifies the capital gains liability of shareholders as an
important friction. Their analysis does not, however, address branding effects as a potential friction.
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hinges t o automatic and revolving doors, are widely known. The company
sells industrial, pneumatic, and hydraulic tools to commercial buyers. Its
two leading distribution channels are Wal-Mart and Home Depot. Home
Depot alone accounted for eighteen percent of Stanley Works' 2001 reve1 4
nue. 8
Stanley Works maintains an all-American brand image. The company
has been based in New Britain, Connecticut, since its founding in the nine
1 5
teenth century. 8 Stanley has sold millions of hand saws, planes, chisels,
rulers, tape measures, screwdrivers, and levels to professionals and serious
Do-It-Yourselfers. The company's brand image taps into the American cul
tural vision of independence, self-reliance, and industrious self-sufficiency.
Its reputation for producing quality tools is a valuable asset. The company
extended its brand by licensing its mark to makers of work boots and gloves,
lawnmowers, ladders, and other products that the company did not manufac
186
ture itself.

2. The Inversion Deal
Corporate inversion describes the legal process of reincorporating an
American company in a tax haven such as Bermuda. The basic deal works
as follows. A domestic parent corporation first secures approval from its
shareholders to do the deal. Then, with appropriate consent, it creates a new
corporation in the tax haven. The foreign corporation exchanges its stock for
the stock or assets of the inverting corporation, which becomes a subsidiary
of the foreign parent. The shareholders of the domestic corporation are left
holding shares of the foreign parent. It is nothing more than a paper
shuffling transaction: no factories, offices, or headquarters must be moved.
There are some nontax regulatory implications. The company may be sub
ject

to

fewer

environmental

regulations

or

consumer

regulations.

Shareholders may not be able to bring lawsuits in state court in the United
States. B y all accounts, though, tax savings are the deal's reason for being.
The tax savings arise from the residence-based system for taxing the in
come from international operations. The United States taxes its citizens,
including corporate citizens, on their worldwide income. Foreign citizens,
however, are taxed only on their U.S. source-based income. Reincorporation
accomplishes nothing for a company that has operations exclusively in the
United States. For companies like Stanley Works with operations both at
home and abroad, the potential gains are impressive, through manners both
clearly licit and less so.

1 84.

Id. at 12.

1 85.

See Developments in the Law-Jobs and Borders, 1 1 8 HARV. L. REv. 2 1 7 1 , 2274 (2003).

1 86. The Beanstalk Group, Client Showcase Case Studies: The Stanley Works, http://
www.beanstalk.com/casestudies/stanley.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2006).
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The United States looks to the place of incorporation to determine
17
whether a corporation is domestic or foreign. 8 Domestic corporations gen
erally face U.S. taxation on foreign source income when that income is
repatriated to the United States. Incorporating a foreign subsidiary to con
duct foreign operations can defer taxation until the foreign earnings are
distributed to the domestic parent as a dividend. Under the "subpart F" anti
deferral regimes, however, certain types of mobile passive income earned
overseas, such as interest, dividends, and royalties, are taxed currently as if
1
earnings had already been distributed to the domestic parent. 88 The domes
tic parent is only able to use the benefits of deferral with respect to income
earned by the foreign subsidiary if it is not "subpart F" income. U.S.-based
multinational corporations, then, are at a significant disadvantage from oth
erwise similarly situated foreign multinationals. Corporate inversions may
19
be rationalized as "self-help territoriality" 8 -a regulatory-engineering ma
190
neuver designed to level what many believe is an unfair playing field.
As a practical matter, inversion offers two main sources of tax savings:
reduction of U.S. tax on foreign income and reduction of U . S . tax on U.S.
income. Reduction of U.S. tax on foreign income results from the elimina
tion of U.S. tax on foreign subpart-F income. A Bermuda company can
make its portfolio investments from Bermuda, earning income from interest,
dividends, and royalties, and not face U.S. tax on that income. The highly
mobile nature of passive income makes this tax reduction somewhat prob
lematic, but there are sound arguments in favor of the United States not
taxing this income.
More problematic is the reduction of U.S. tax on U.S. income. These
savings take place primarily through techniques of earnings-stripping and
transfer pricing. Earnings-stripping refers to techniques in which the U.S.
subsidiary is saddled with large amounts of intercompany debt; interest
payments to the foreign parent are normally deductible in the United States.
Other techniques for reducing U.S. income include aggressive manipulation
of royalty payments to the parent company, administrative fees, and transfer
191
prices. Code provisions preclude the ability of a multinational corporation
to eliminate U.S. tax on U.S. income entirely, but opportunities for substan
92
tial tax savings remain. 1

1 87. l.R.C. § 7701 (a)(4) (2000) ("The term 'domestic' when applied to a corporation . . .
means created or organized in the United States or under the law of the United States or of any
State . . . ).
"

1 88.

See generally l.R.C. §§ 952-64 (2000 & Supp. 2003).

1 89. See Michael S. Kirsch, The Congressional Response to Corporate Expatriations: The
Tension Between Symbols and Substance in the Taxation of Multinational Corporations, 24 VA. TAX
REV. 475, 491 (2005).
190.
Cf OFFICE OF TAX POL'Y, DEP'T OF TREASURY, CORPORATE INVERSION TRANSACTIONS:
TAX POLICY IMPLICATIONS (2002), http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/docs/inversion.pdf.
191.

Kirsch, supra note 1 89, a t 493.

1 92. See id. Section 163(j) limits interest stripping by limiting the deductibility of interest
payments to related corporations by taxpayers with excessive leverage. Section 482 addresses trans
fer pricing and other non-arms-length transactions that attempt to shift income improperly. Id.
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Inversions can trigger some immediate adverse tax consequences, par
ticularly for shareholders. If the inversion is structured as a stock transaction
in which shareholders exchange their old shares for new shares in the corpo
rate parent, then the shareholders may have to recognize gain equal to the
excess of the fair-market value of the stock over the shareholder's adjusted
193
basis.
The inversion, in other words, is treated as a realization event. The
corporation itself may have to pay tax if the inversion is structured as an
194

asset acquisition by the new foreign parent.

Stanley Works proposed an inversion transaction to its shareholders; re
incorporation requires shareholder approval. The company explained to
shareholders that the transaction was necessary to compete globally: "In
today's global economy, numerous foreign competitors pay lower taxes on
their worldwide operations. The U.S. tax rules place us at a competitive dis
195
advantage in the global marketplace." The company noted that two of its
U.S. competitors, Ingersoll-Rand and Cooper Industries, reincorporated in
Bermuda. "In our view our reincorporation in Bermuda is necessary in order
to create a level playing field enabling us to become a stronger, more com
196
petitive company."
The company noted, however, that it would retain its
character as an American company. "It is our goal to keep our management
197
Market
in the U.S. and our headquarters in New Britain, Connecticut."
reaction to the inversion announcement was positive, and the company nar
rowly received shareholder approval. The shareholder vote was declared
void, however, after the Connecticut Attorney General sued to block the
transaction, alleging that 40l (k) shareholders may have been confused by
contradictory statements in their materials regarding the consequences of a
198
failure to vote by proxy.
In the months following the voided shareholder
vote, public protests and media criticism increased, and the board of Direc
199

tors ultimately voted to cancel the transaction in August 2002.

3 . What Stopped the Deal?
The Stanley Works inversion would have generated tax savings for the
company. Market reaction was positive. Why, then, did the Stanley Works
board reverse course?

1 93.

l.R.C. § 367 (2000) ; Kirsch, supra note 1 89, at 494-95 .

1 94.
l.R.C. § 367(a)(l ) (2000); Kirsch, supra note 189, at 495; Samuel C. Thompson, Jr. &
Robert Allen Clary II, Economic Substance, Inversions, and the Bush-Kerry International Tax Re
form Debate, 103 TAX NOTES 1 385, 1 546--48 (June 14, 2004).
1 95.

Stanley Works Ltd., Registration Statement (Form S-4), at 2 (May 28, 2002).

1 96.

Id.

1 97.

Id.

1 98.

See Developments in the Law-Jobs and Borders, supra note 1 85 , at 2274.

1 99.

Kirsch, supra note 1 89, at 529.
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Political pressure was an obvious concern. Politicians were not shy
200
Senator Charles Grassley charged

about branding Stanley Works a traitor.

the company with taking advantage of the economic effect of the September

1 1 terrorist attacks: "Here's a company pulling up stakes when the cleanup
201
at Ground Zero is barely done."
The political rhetoric led to legislation that prevents expatriated corpora
tions from entering into government contracts with the Department of
202
Homeland Security. The restriction may be waived, however, if the Secre
tary of Homeland Security determines that a waiver is required "in the
203
interests of homeland security."
Some states enacted similar provisions
204
Con
barring state agencies from contracting with expatriate corporations.
gress considered several tax bills aimed at eliminating the benefits of
corporate inversions, ultimately enacting a forward-looking provision in
205
2004, long after the Stanley Works deal failed.
Stanley Works did not cite bad publicity as a reason for canceling the
proposed transaction. Instead, the company rather dubiously pointed to "the
growing prospect of comprehensive tax legislation . . . . Congress has started
down a path to deliver comprehensive tax reform that would eliminate the
206
inequities of U.S. international taxation . . . ."
But it seems unlikely that
the board anticipated meaningful international tax reform. What was really
going on?
The Stanley Works inversion received significant attention from tax
207
A combination of factors, including shareholder hostility, legal

scholars.

uncertainty, and patriotism may have contributed to management's decision
not to move forward. Even the issue of shareholder hostility is complex.
Some shareholders may have been motivated by altruism, patriotism, or so
cial responsibility, while others may have been motivated by economic self
interest. (Recall that a stock inversion like the one proposed by Stanley
Works triggers a shareholder-level tax. The amount of the tax depends on
the shareholder's basis.) It is also possible that some shareholders resisted
the move for non-tax-related reasons. With the parent company in Bermuda,

200.
Cf Nader, supra note 1 06, at 201 (noting a ban on repatriation as one of several impor
tant social-responsibility issues).
20 1 . Tim Reason, Love It and Leave It? The Hue-and-Cry Over Corporate Inversions May
Change the Way Overseas Income ls Taxed, CFO.COM, July 1 , 2002, http://www.cfo.com/
article.cfm/3005328/1/c_3046525?f=archives.
202.

Kirsch, supra note 1 89, at 482.

203.

Homeland Security Act of 2002, 6 U.S.C. 395(d) (Supp. 2003).

204.

Kirsch, supra note 1 89, at 499.

205.

Id. at 506.

206. Stanley Works, Current Report (Form 8-K), at 5 (Aug. I , 2002), available at
http://www.secinfo.com/dsV sj. 3 1 k4.htm.
207. See, e.g. , OFFICE OF TAX PoL' v, supra note 190; Desai & Hines, supra note 1 83 ; Kirsch,
supra note 1 89; Thompson & Clary, supra note 1 94.
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shareholders would have had a more difficult time protecting their rights
20
through a derivative action. 8
Michael Kirsch's recent article provides the most detailed examination
of the Stanley Works transaction and the political fallout that followed.
Kirsch describes the Homeland Security restrictions as symbolic legislation.
He cites the rhetoric used by inversion critics--calling the corporations
Benedict Arnolds, traitors, tax dodgers, tax cheats, and so on, and the use of
September

1 1 , 200 1 as the retroactive date of many bills-as evidence of the

symbolic importance of the bill.

209

But he argues that the legislation had lit

tle instrumental effect.
Kirsch views the Homeland Security legislation largely as a victory for
210
In one sense, Kirsch is certainly correct. As he

expatriate corporations.

points out, the legislation is drafted in such a way to allow U.S. subsidiaries
of expatriate corporations to contract with the Department of Homeland
Security, eviscerating the practical impact of the bill. For example, Accen
ture, a Bermuda company that inverted in
21 1
contract by the Department in 2004 .

200 1 , was awarded a $ 10 billion

Kirsch does not directly address the branding implications of the deal.
212
Kirsch ac

He does, however, discuss the effects in terms of social norms.

knowledges that "there also appear to have been some aspects of nonlegal
213
social norms enforcement in play." He explains,
As one contemporary

newspaper article observed, "The question is

whether all this ill will [arising from the planned expatriation] is headed
out to the Home Depot in Peoria." Another article on the same topic ob
served that "[t]he typical Stanley customer is an American male, age

54.

25

to

Often, he is a tradesman who belongs to a union. And union members

generally know which companies are perceived as friendly to American
214

workers and American causes."

Kirsch also notes that Stanley sold retail products to consumers under its
215

own name, whereas most of the other expatriating corporations did not.

208.

Developments in the law-Jobs and Borders, supra note 1 85, at 2280.

209.

Kirsch, supra note 1 89, at 509.

2 1 0. Id. at 5 1 1 ("It enabled its supporters to claim credit for some legislation that purported to
address a perceived problem, thereby satisfying the general public's demand for action. At the same
time . . . it ensured that the interested, involved group that would actually be affected by the legisla
tion [i.e. expatriate corporations] received their desired result.").
211.

Id. at 5 14.

Id. at 523 ("[A] corporation could be the target of second order sanctions to the extent
2 1 2.
social norms disfavored a corporate parent changing its place of incorporation in pursuit of tax
savings. For example, the firm might experience a backlash from U.S. customers and a possible
reduction in revenue.").

2 1 3.

Id. at 530.

2 1 4. Id. at 53 1 (quoting Dan Haar, Image Hammered: Stanley Move Draws Sharp Criticism,
But Will Customers Stick with Brand?, HARTFORD COURANT, May 10, 2002, at E l ; Matthew
Lubanko, Stanley 's Brand Tarnished? Experts: Over Long Haul, Consumers Aren 't Likely to Ham
mer Toolmaker, HARTFORD COURANT, Aug. 3, 2002, at E l ) .
215.

Id. a t 532.
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Kirsch, however, argues that Stanley's decision resulted not from informal
social-norm enforcement, but from concern about legal-based instrumental
26
factors. 1
With respect to Stanley Works, Kirsch's analysis understates the effec
tiveness of rhetoric. The rhetoric tarnished the brand. Although it is possible
that Stanley Works declined to do the inversion because of its uncertain le
gal treatment, that explanation strikes me as highly unlikely. Retroactive tax
legislation is unusual. Here, I think the simpler explanation is the correct
one: the political rhetoric worked. It amplified the branding implications of
the deal.
Inversion critics offered a powerful narrative, casting Stanley Works'
management in the stereotypical role of greedy capitalist. The story is a fa
miliar one. In popular culture, local communities are often presented as
under attack by soulless multinational corporations. In the movie Other

People 's Money,211 for example, a takeover artist (Larry "the Liquidator"
Garfield), played by Danny DeVito, targets the New England Wire and Ca

ble Company. The struggling company is defended by its paternalistic
2
founder, Andrew Jorgensen, played by Gregory Peck. 18 Stanley Works could
easily drop into this familiar narrative as the old wire-and-cable company.
By barraging the Stanley Works directors with publicity, opponents forced
the directors to choose their self-image-would they be Danny DeVito, or
Gregory Peck?
The political rhetoric might not have had the same impact on a reinsur
ance company or oil and gas company. No one expects Exxon or Tyco to be
socially responsible. Stanley Works' inversion attempt ultimately may have
been sunk by its own valuable brand image. Consider the many companies
that completed inversions before Stanley Works: McDermott, Helen of Troy,
Triton Energy, Chicago B ridge & Iron, Tyco, Santa Fe International, Fruit of
the Loom, Playstar, Gold Reserve, Xoma, Transocean, PXRE, Everest Rein
surance, White Mountain Insurance, Trenwick, Applied Power,

R&B

Falcon, Foster Wheeler, Cooper Industries, Global Marine, Ingersoll Rand,
29
Nabors Industries, and Noble Drilling. 1 Of these, only Fruit of the Loom
sells directly to a broad base of consumers. If Stanley Works were just an
other reinsurance company or oil and gas conglomerate, its directors would
now be attending annual meetings in the Caribbean instead of Connecticut.

2 1 6. Id. at 530. Kirsch explains that members of Congress had offered Stanley assurances that
tax reform was on the horizon, and he notes that some of the tax-focused bills in Congress might
have eliminated the tax benefits that Stanley sought, and that the Homeland Security legislation was
being actively considered. See id.
2 1 7.

OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY (Warner Bros. 199 1 ).

2 1 8. See Larry Ribstein, Wall Street and Vine: Hollywood's View of Business 14 (Univ. Ill.
Law & Econ. Research Paper No. LE05-010, 2005), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=563 l 8 l .
2 19.

Desai & Hines, supra note 1 83, at 1 8--20.
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Ill. BRANDING THE DEAL: THE MECHANISMS
OF MARKETING INEFFICIENCY

The case studies in the previous Section show that deal structure can af
fect the brand image of a company. Finding the common thread, though, is a
challenge. Is the branding effect accidental and unexpected, or can it be pre
dicted? How does a decision about legal structure filter down to the point at
which it has an effect on consumers? Does branding a deal make sense for
all companies, or only some?
In this Section, I argue that the branding effects of deal structure are
most important for companies that target early adopters or other opinion
22°
leaders.
Companies are more likely to reach consumers effectively
through branding moments early in the lifecycle of the company, and the
branding message of an unusual deal structure is more likely to reach con
sumers indirectly. The branding implications of deals are more important,
then, for companies that can target early adopters or opinion leaders, such as
technology companies, firms that produce trendy or fashionable consumer
goods, cult brands, and socially responsible companies.
To explain which companies are more likely to use deal structure as a
branding mechanism, it is useful to consider the process and not just the
underlying activities of the firm. Consider two alternative explanations for
branding through deal structure: managerial consumption and consumer
signaling.

Managerial consumption. Unusual deal structures might simply reflect
idiosyncratic, economically irrational preferences on the part of the foun
ders. Larry and Sergey might be expressing geek solidarity; Ben and Jerry,
localism; Steve Jobs, altruism; and the Stanley Works managers, patriotism.
Their chosen deal structures might reflect an effort by founders to engage in
"conspicuous consumption," meaning that the founders derive utility not
from the intrinsic value of the deal structure but rather because of its waste
fulness or opulence. The structure's value exists only because it could be
22
observed by select friends and competitors. 1
If managerial consumption is the real goal, then we should approach the
deals with a skeptical eye, as we might view other goods with a strong con
sumption component, like corporate charitable contributions, golf retreats,
or private jets. If managerial consumption is driving these unusual cases,
then lawyers involved in such deals have an ethical duty to look out for the
222

corporate entity and its shareholders.

220. For a discussion of innovators, early adopters, and the diffusion of innovation, see
EVERETT M. ROGERS, DIFFUSION OF INNOVATION (4th ed. 1 995); GEOFFREY A. MOORE, CROSSING
THE CHASM: MARKETING AND SELLING HIGH-TECH PRODUCTS TO MAINSTREAM CUSTOMERS 9-25
(rev. ed. 1 999).
22 1 . On the origins of the term "conspicuous consumption," see THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE
THEORY OF THE LEISURE CLASS 75-77 (B. w. Huebsch ed. 1 9 1 8). In this context, it is not a leisure

class but rather an entrepreneurial class at issue.

222.
I n practice, of course, the business judgment rule would likely protect the company
against any potential lawsuits.
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Consumer signaling. Alternatively, unusual deal structures may send
valuable messages to consumers. If the structure is costly to the finn in the

short tenn, it may prove valuable in the long run by acting as an investment
3
in reputation and signaling quality assurance. 22 This familiar model of
branding, often referred to as the Klein-Leffler model, 224 would suggest that
the unusual deal structure is simply a reputational bonding mechanism. The

deals are costly but economically rational, as the resulting brand equity is
expected to pay dividends over time. This signaling explanation suggests
that companies that produce credence goods are more likely to employ un

usual deal structures.

But unlike the usual Klein-Leffler situation, in this case the signal need

not be especially costly to be valuable. 225 It may also be valuable if opinion

leaders can verify the signal and communicate the message to consumers.

Klein-Leffler focuses our attention on the suppliers of goods and services;

advertising reflects their commitment to deliver quality products over the
long haul. But the key here is the demand side of the equation: consumers.
Deal structure may be more effective for some companies than others, de

pending on the demographics of their consumers and the stage of their brand

development. Specifically, deal structure is an effective advertising medium
when it reaches early adopters and opinion leaders: sophisticated, knowl
edgeable consumers who start trends.226
Casual empiricism supports the signaling explanation. It seems unlikely,

for example, that the Stanley Works directors suddenly and spontaneously

became more patriotic for reasons unrelated to branding. And while the

Google founders are quirky, it seems unlikely that they could have forced

the auction structure on the other pre-IPO shareholders without justifying
the move in terms of long-term shareholder value. Still, I cannot dismiss the
managerial consumption explanation out of hand. Empirical testing would

be useful. For example, the managerial-consumption explanation would

predict that companies with weak shareholder accountability would be more
likely to use unusual deal structures. The signaling story, on the other hand,

223.
Marketing scholars already find a direct relationship between a firm's financial perform
ance and the perceived quality of its goods. See Jerry B. Swann et al., Trademarks and Marketing,
9 1 TRADEMARK REPORTER 787, 790 (200 1 ). It is only one step further to take a firm's structuring of
internal corporate governance matters and use it to upgrade the perceived quality of the goods.
224.

See Klein & Leffler, supra note 7 1 .

Focusing on deal structure as a method of quality assurance for credence goods is part of
the story, although ultimately it does not seem to explain everything. If deal structure is used solely
as a quality-assurance tool, the value of the signal depends on its cost. While it seems likely that the
contract designs in the case of Google, Ben & Jerry's, or Apple were inefficient (setting aside any
branding implications), it is not so clear that the Ben & Jerry's and Apple structures were exceed
ingly costly. Nor is it clear that the Google founders anticipated leaving quite so much money on the
table. Furthermore, the brand equity generated by the deal structure may not bear a close relation
ship to its cost. Finally, if quality assurance were the whole story, then one would expect deal
structure to be used most often to brand credence goods. But consider the list of firms that have
conducted auction IPOs. While some companies are "integrity companies"-Momingstar and ar
guably Google-others offer experience goods for which the quality is immediately apparent, such
as Peel's Coffee.
225.

226.

See generally Gladwell, supra note 72.
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suggests that the u s e o f unusual deal structures i s more related to the process
of branding than to the process of financing. It is not the manager
shareholder relationship that drives these deals; it is the company-consumer
relationship--the topic to which I now tum.
A.

Branding through Desirable Atmospherics

The legal system often treats consumers as if they care only about the
221
functionality of the products they buy.
This approach is grounded in the
thinking of the pre-World War II "Harvard School" of economics, which
viewed brand marketing as little more than a method for insulating market
228
share from price competition and creating high barriers to entry. Advertis
ing deserved scorn, not praise. Harvard's Edward Chamberlain would have
permitted unlimited confusion through imitation, rendering advertising al
229
most pointless.
Advertising was little more than consumer deception,
tricking consumers into buying products based on illusory wants or de230
sires.
•

Legal scholarship reflected the Harvard School's teachings. In his semi
nal article, Advertising and the Public Interest, Yale's Ralph Brown
characterized modern advertising as a "black art" whose practitioners "are
part of the larger army which employs threats, cajolery, emotions, personal
231
Brown

ity, persistence and facts in what is termed aggressive selling."

drew a sharp line between providing information and persuasive advertising.
Only the former benefited the public interest. ''To the extent that the blan
dishments of sellers inform buyers what is to be bought, and at what price,
232
advertising undoubtedly quickens the stream of commerce."
Persuasive
advertising, on the other hand, was economic waste. "If we consider first the
total stream of production and consumption, persuasive advertising seems
only to consume resources that might be put to better use producing more
goods and services. It does not increase total demand; it only increases
233
wants."
Brown dismissed advertising's shaping of consumer preferences
234
as mere illusions.
Competition among brands was a choice "between one
227. See Douglas A. Kysar, Preference for Processes: The Process/Product Distinction and
the Regulation of Consumer Choice, 1 1 8 HARV. L. REv. 525 (2005).
228.

See Swann et al., supra note 223, at 788.

229.

Id.

230. See Mark A. Lemley, The Modem Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 1 08
YALE L.J. 1 687, 1 692 ( 1 999).
23 1 . Ralph S. Brown, Jr., Advenising and the Public Interest: Legal Protection of Trade Symbols, 57 YALE L.J. 1 1 65, 1 165-66 ( 1 948).
232.

Id. at I I 68.

233.

Id. at I 1 69.

234.

Id. at I 1 8 1 . Brown notes:

Other values derive from the proposition that cheapness is not enough. The buyer of an adver
tised good buys more than a parcel of food or fabric; he buys the pause that refreshes. the hand
that has never lost its skill, the priceless ingredient that is the reputation of its maker. All these
may be illusions, but they cost money to create, and if the creators recoup their outlay, who is
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illusion and another."

235

1 63 1

The task for courts addressing trademark claims,

therefore, was to pick out the threads of informative advertising, and ignore
236
the persuasive fabric. Trademark protection, B rown concluded, should be
limited to cases in which there was a likelihood of consumer confusion .
237
. Times have changed.
Most scholars today, applying the lessons of the
Chicago School, view brands as a mechanism for enhancing consumer effi
ciency, diversifying goods, improving quality control, and facilitating entry
23
for new manufacturers. 8 Trademark law increasingly protects trade sym
bols not just in cases of consumer confusion, but also in cases in which
another's use of the trademark may affect the cultural meaning of the
239

brand.

Marketing scholarship reflects this shift in how we understand consum
ers. A consumer buying a car looks at more than price, power, safety, color,
and gas mileage. Consumers also buy the brand-the set of mental associa
tions that accompanies the name. But the fact that branding is triggered by
memory does not mean that it is smoke and mirrors. Consumers strive to
satisfy their psychological needs, not just their physical needs. Opening a
Tiffany's box feels different than opening a box from Kmart, and will appeal
240
to different customers.
Brands help the consumer create an identity, not
24
just identify the source of the product. 1 Through brands, products produce
not just functional benefits but emotional and self-expressive benefits.
B rand image is a powerful form of communication with the consumer.
Brand image, although intangible, is a valuable piece of property with in
242
trinsic worth and meaning. As explained by Jessica Litman, the value of a
the poorer? Among the many illusions which advertising can fashion are those of lavishness,
refinement, security, and romance.
Id.

235.

Id. at 1 1 83.

236.

Id. at 1 1 84.

237. For a more comprehensive discussion of the development of brands, and the "brand
manager system," see George S. Low & Ronald A. Fullerton, Brands, Brand Management and the
Brand Manager System: A Critical-Historical Evaluation, 3 1 J. MARKETING RES. 1 7 3 ( 1 994). Low
and Fullerton argue that as corporate management evolves away from bureaucratic conglomerate
systems to more entrepreneurial ones, more entrepreneurial brand-manager roles will develop. Us
ing deal structure as a marketing device may become more common as brand managers seek more
creative ways to market brands.
238.

See Swann et al., supra note 223, at 790.

239. Laura R. Bradford, Parody and Perception: Using Cognitive Research to Expand Fair
Use in Copyright (NYU Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 05-09, 2005), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=728604; Jessica Litman, Breakfast with Batman: The Public Interest in the
Advertising Age, 1 08 YALE L.J. 1 7 17, 1721-25 (1999). Litman explains, "Courts' increased willing
ness to find an actionable likelihood of confusion has meant that, as a practical matter, nearly any
unauthorized use of a trade symbol with the potential to undermine the symbol's trademark distinct
iveness may persuade a federal judge to grant an injunction." Id. at 1 722.
240. Aaker explains, "Further, the wearing of a Tiffany bracelet may even make the wearer
feel more attractive and confident . . . . The associations of prestige and quality are hypothesized to
actually change the use experience." DAVID A. AAKER, MANAGING BRAND EQUITY 1 6 1 ( 1 99 1 ).
24 1 .

Swann et al. , supra note 223, at 796.

242.

See Alex Kozinski, Trademarks Unplugged, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 960, 962-63 ( 1 993).
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trademark like Batman has nothing to do with identifying Warner Brothers
as the manufacturing source. "The worth of such valuable trade symbols lies
less in their designation of product source than in their power to imbue a
243
product line with desirable atmospherics."
Indeed, atmospherics may
dominate all other product attributes. The product can become simply a de
livery vehicle for the brand, which is what is really being consumed. Litman
explains:
Ask a child, and he'll persuade you that the difference between a box of
Kellogg's Com Flakes with a picture of Batman on it and some other box
without one is real. There is nothing imaginary about it. It has nothing to
do with the way cereal tastes. What kids want isn't a nutritious part of a
244

complete breakfast; they want B atman to have breakfast with them.

In a world where many products serve primarily as brand delivery vehi
245
cles-Derek Jeter Bobblehead dolls, NARS Orgasm perfumes, Black Dog
246
T-Shirts -the importance of brand image is hard to deny. If cereal is really
about Batman, then the same might be true for other products. Ice cream
isn't just creamy and sweet; it is rain forests and hormone-free cows and
leaf-peeping in Vermont. An iPod is not just a convenient method for listen
ing to music; it is a hip world where life is random and rewards go to those
who think different.
If I'm right that we live in a world where brand image is both richly tex
tured and powerful in its impact on consumers, it is not surprising that deal
structure weaves its way into the purchasing decision. Deal structure
changes the atmospherics. From a pure, rational-actor point of view, it is
unclear why consumers care about the social responsibility of a manufac
247
turer, let alone its internal corporate govemance. Yet we know that Ben &
Jerry's sells more ice cream because of its preservation efforts in the Ama
24
zon rainforest. 8

243.

Litman, supra note 239, at 1 726.

244. Id. at 1727. Whether trademark law should protect the powerful impact of brand image is
beyond the scope of this Article. Litman makes a powerful case that while the atmospherics are real,
they are not worthy of legal protection.
245.

See Rob Walker, Color Coding, N.Y. TIMES, July 3 1 , 2005, § 6 (Magazine), at 1 7.

246. See Posting of Victor Fleischer lo Conglomerate, http://www.theconglomerate.org/
2005/08/gen_x_six_feet_.html (Aug. 16, 2005).
247. ROBERT H. FRANK, WHAT PRICE THE MORAL HIGH GROUND?: ETHICAL DILEMMAS IN
COMPETITIVE ENVIRONMENTS 65 (2003) ("The standard free-rider model suggests that buyers will
not be willing to pay a premium for products produced by socially responsible firms.").
248. Id. Recent scholarship has picked up on the changed relationship between consumers and
brands. Cognitive science research suggests that our brains classify things as good or bad as soon as
we see them. Laura Bradford, an intellectual-property scholar, has noted that much of "modem
advertising is designed to increase positive associations with advertised brands and products through
use of symbolic and emotional appeals to the values of the target audience." Bradford, supra note
239, at 3 1 . See generally John O' Shaughnessy & Nicholas Jackson O' Shaughnessy, PERSUASION IN
ADVERTISING (2003).
Douglas Kysar has identified the importance of process in consumer-preference satisfaction.
Regulators and economists draw a process-product distinction. Consumers, however, derive utility
from understanding the process by which a product is made. Kysar explains:
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Reaching Early Adopters

Deal structure is not likely to be an effective advertising medium for
reaching large numbers of consumers. A typical ice cream purchaser or
computer user doesn't know anything about IPOs. One particular class of
consumers, however, is better educated, wealthier, smarter, more open
rninded, more adventurous, and has a higher social status than your average
249
consumer: early adopters. And that is exactly who marketers try to reach
to establish a brand image. Early adopters are sophisticated consumers who
experiment with new products and, by word-of-mouth, spread the message
to other consumers. Early adopters seek information about innovations more
250
actively than later adopters and have higher degrees of opinion leadership.
As an advertising medium, deal structure resembles other specialized
marketing techniques like buzz marketing. Consider the market for ad space
on biogs. Blog ads would seem like an ineffective use of resources, consid
ering the narrow readership of most biogs. The ad space sells, however,
because it allows companies who want to reach early adopters an easy ac
cess point. Because readers of blogs tend to be highly literate, highly
networked, and influential, purchasers of blog ads skew towards the likes of
Paramount Pictures, Wall Street Journal, Penguin Books, Oxford University
25
Press, and various political groups. 1
Using deal structure as a branding device thus seems especially well
suited to companies reaching out to early adopters to build a brand. These
include technology brands, integrity brands, cult brands, and socially re
sponsible brands.

Technology brands. Technology products demand trust from consumers.
Consumers must invest their time in learning how to use the technology on
top of the financial cost. Many consumers, then, wait to adopt a new tech
nology until a critical mass has already done so. This process--documented
in detail in Everett Rogers's
Malcolm Gladwell's

Diffusion of Innovations and more recently in
The Tipping Point shows the importance of early
-

adopters, who act as a bridge between innovators and the maj ority of con
sumers.

[J]ust as people derive utility from feeling as if they participate in certain types of labor or po
litical decisionmaking processes, so too might consumers derive utility from participating in a
marketplace that is rich with information about the consequences of consumption. Such a mar
ketplace enables consumers to feel as if their purchasing behavior expresses a viewpoint on
critical aspects of the global economy, even apart from consideration of any instrumental im
pact that such purchasing behavior might have on manufacturing processes.
Kysar, supra note 227, at 607. Kysar argues against further use of the process-product distinction by
regulators.

249.

See EVERETT M. ROGERS, DIFFUSION OF INNOVATIONS 288-90 (5th ed. 2003).

250.

Id. at 292. Particularly for deals with subtle branding implications, like an auction IPO or

a policy against slotting allowances, branding is only relevant to the extent PR about the deal
reaches financially sophisticated consumers. The socioeconomic status of early adopters makes
them a natural fit.

25 1 .

Blogads, Blog Advertising Makes Opinions, http://www.blogads.com/advertiser_html

(last visited Mar. 20, 2006).
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Before an innovation can cross the chasm into widespread adoption, the
manufacturer must win over the early adopters. When commercializing a
product for wider distribution, companies sometimes make changes to the
product that produce short-term profits but weaken the technology. Unusual
deal structures may allow technology companies to signal to consumers that,
notwithstanding the presence of all the bankers and lawyers, the nerds are
still in charge.

Integrity brands and socially responsible brands. Credence goods have
qualities that the consumer cannot fully evaluate even after purchase and
252
consumption.
Integrity brands are brands that generate a sense of trust
where the integrity or social responsibility of the firm is an important prod
uct attribute. Examples include healthcare, financial services, education,
253
environmentally sensitive products, and organic foods. With these prod
ucts, the quality of the goods is difficult to measure even after purchase. A
shareholder in a mutual fund can easily observe cash, but not opportunities
254
for managerial rent-seeking;
a fine cup of Peet's coffee does not taste or
ganic. The integrity and values of the managers serve as a proxy for the
integrity of the process of producing the product. By signaling the integrity
of the managers, deal structure can signal the quality of other attributes that
are difficult to observe.
With these products, companies are not concerned about early adopters
so much as other opinion leaders or information specialists. Consumers pur
chasing integrity products rely on information specialists such as corporate
social responsibility (CSR) groups, experts, or others who have already in
vested the time to gather the relevant information. Lawyers and law
professors, for example, are frequently asked for legal services referrals.
Socially responsible mutual funds serve as reputational intermediaries to
allow CSR-sensitive investors to allocate their investments in a socially re
sponsible manner. Well-known social-responsibility brands like Ben &
Jerry's and the Body Shop cultivate their consumers through their well
255
informed opinion leaders.

252.
Michael R. Darby & Edi Karny, Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of Fraud, 1 6
J.L. & EcoN. 67 ( 1 973); Phillip Nelson, Infonnation and Consumer Behavior, 7 8 J . PoL. EcoN. 3 1 1
(1 970); George J . Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. POL. EcoN. 2 1 3 ( 1961).
253. Jason Scott Johnston, Signaling Social Responsibility: On the Law and Economics of
Market Incentives for Corporate Environmental Performance 70 (Univ. Of Penn. Law Sch. Inst. for
Law & Econ, Research Paper No. 05- 1 6, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=725 103 ("The
things that [social-responsibility-minded] consumers and investors care about-the environmental,
health and safety effects of a company's operations-are what economists call credence goods,
goods that the consumer (or investor) never actually learns about fully, even after buying and con
suming the good (or investing in the stock)."); see also Timothy J. Feddersen & Thomas W.
Gilligan, Saints and Markets: Activists and the Supply of Credence Goods, 10 J. EcoN. & MGMT.
STRATEGY 149 (200 1 ).
254. See William A. B irdthistle, Compensating Power: An Analysis of Rents and Rewards in
the Mutual Fund Industry, 80 TuL. L. REv. (forthcoming 2006), available at http://
law.marquette.edu/hurt/Mutua!Funds-Birdthistle8-24-05.pdf.
255.
E.g., Lewis D. Solomon, On the Frontier of Capitalism: Implementation of Humanomics
by Modem Publicly Held Corporations: A Critical Assessment, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1625,
1 638-63 ( 1 993) (discussing Ben & Jerry's and The Body Shop in depth).
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Information specialists who can verify firms' claims about integrity are
256
Ex post litigation chal

essential to avoiding the problem of cheap talk.

lenging false or misleading claims is unlikely to be effective. And, as
illustrated by the recent case involving Nike's statements about sweatshops,
257
cheap talk may even be protected by the First Amendment. To make the
signal credible, then, the information must be verified or certified by a third
25
party. 8 Like the auditors of financial statements, NGOs or other third-party
verifiers can investigate the integrity of firms and pass their opinions along
to consumers. The presence of these information specialists makes deal
structure an appealing advertising medium.

Cult brands. There is no settled meaning to the term "cult brand." As I
use the term here, I refer to products that have strong expressive value. Rit
ual

products-products

that

consumers

buy

through

small,

regular

purchases-lend themselves to this category. Companies that become part
of a social routine, such as Coldstone Ice Cream, Starbucks and Peet's Cof
fee, and Krispy Kreme, may work well. Similarly, many entertainment
products become a regular part of a consumer's day. ESPN, the sports net
work, brought a sense of journalistic integrity to sports coverage. KCRW, a
public radio station in Los Angeles, rejects payola and instead offers "hand
picked" music from knowledgeable deej ays.
Other cult brands include technology firms that aim to disrupt product
markets by changing the user's relationship with the product. Examples in
clude Apple (including not just the Mac but the iPod and iTunes), TiVo,
NetFlix, Flickr (an online photo-management site), and Facebook (a social
networking site). Using such products tends not just to improve a con
sumer's functional relationship with the product but also to express
identification as a contrarian. Apple is anti-Microsoft, TiVo is anti
commercial television, NetFlix is anti-Blockbuster, and so on. For these
products, the early-adopter strategy is an obvious fit.
If this all sounds rather trendy, that's because it is. Cult brands rely on
information specialists-fashion leaders or mavens-to convey the informa
tion to a broad consumer base. These fashion leaders, in order to maintain
259
their status as leaders, must continually be on the lookout for new insights.
This also leads them to consume at the upper end of the merchandise

256.

See Johnston, supra note 253.

257. See Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 261 (Cal. 2002), cen granted, 537 U.S. 1 099, cert.
dismissed, 539 U.S. 654 (2003). The case settled shortly after certiorari was dismissed as improvi
dently granted. See Johnston, supra note 253, at 1 1 1 . "[I]n the absence of potential civil liability for
false SR claims, it may be impossible for the 'good' SR firms to effectively distinguish themselves
from the 'bad' SR firms." Id. at 1 1 9.
258. See id. at 70 (noting that nongovernmental organizations play a "crucial role" in making
the CSR market).
259. GARY S. BECKER & KEVIN M. MURPHY, SOCIAL EcONOMICS: MARKET B EHAVIOR IN A
SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT 140 (2000) ("Alert leaders recognize that their distinctive behavior is only
temporary, and are on the lookout for new ways to be distinguished from the followers who are
closing the gap in behavior.").
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260

Recall that consumers are seeking not Gust) functionality, but
261
(also) satisfaction of other social needs when they buy products.
Quality
matters. But when a consumer's assessment of the quality of a product de
pends not j ust on intrinsic value but on what someone else thinks, strange
things start to happen to demand curves and equilibrium prices. A few good
262
(or bad) words from the right person can cause an avalanche. With these
fads and fashions, demand is unstable, oscillating wildly following even
263
small shocks.
*

*

*

In sum, companies that sell products rich in credence qualities would
seem to benefit most from using deal structure as a branding mechanism,
particularly if early adopters or opinion leaders are important to their mar
keting strategy. I offer one last example: groceries. Consumers used to have
a more personal relationship with their grocers and butchers. In today's su
permarkets, however, some foods have credence qualities, especially as
consumers place a higher value on difficult-to-verify attributes like safety,
source of origin (for example, shade-grown coffee) and organic farming
264
methods.
Whole Foods, Wild Oats, and Trader Joe's, unlike conventional
265
supermarkets, refuse slotting allowances.
Most economists consider slot
ting allowances, which are payments made by manufacturers to retailers for
shelf space, to be a normal consequence of the competitive market for shelf
2
space. 66 Trader Joe's, along with Whole Foods, instead refuses these
260. Id. at 97 ("[L]eaders end up consuming excessively high quality merchandise in competi
tive markets in order to be separated from other consumers.").
261 . Id. ("Consumers are largely paying for image, prestige, and distinctiveness, which are
social rather than material characteristics of certain products.").
262. Id. at 79 ("The general conclusion is that competition in social markets may magnify
small differences in perceived quality among classes of objects into very large differences in equilib
rium prices.").
263.

Becker & Murphy write:

The positive slope . . . does not mean that demand in that interval rises as the price of [the]
good increases, but rather that each household's willingness to pay for this good increases
greatly as other households are consuming more of the good. . . . In other words, demand is
unstable in this interval, and explodes up or down in response even to small shocks.
Id. at 136.

264. Johnston, supra note 253, at 86 (noting that consumers are willing to pay premium prices
for pesticide-free organic produce and seafood that is certified to be safe).
265. Seth Lubove, Food Porn, FORBES, Feb. 14, 2005, at 102, available at
http://www.forbes.com/global/2005/0207/050.html; see also RBC CAPITAL MARKETS RESEARCH
REPORT, WILD OATS MARKETS, INC. 5 (2001) (on file with author). It is worth noting that Wild Oats'
CEO, Perry Odak, was formerly the CEO of Ben & Jerry's. RBC CAPITAL MARKETS RESEARCH
REPORT, supra at 8; see also Trader Joe's, How We Do Business, http://www.traderjoes.com/
about/wedobiz.asp (last visited Mar. 20, 2006) (noting that Trader Joe's does not accept slotting
fees).
266. See Benjamin Klein & Joshua Wright, The Economics of Slotting Arrangements (Am. Law
& Econ. Ass'n Ann . Meetings, Paper No. 53, 2005), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=773464; K.
Sudhir & Vithala R. Rao, Slotting Allowances: An Empirical Investigation (Mar. 2004) (unpublished
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arrangements, viewing them as an infringement on their commitment to pro
267
vide quality products.
Whole Foods also has an unusual executive
compensation policy, limiting cash compensation of executives to fourteen
26
times the average fulltime-employee wage. 8
C ONC LU SION
It is hard to escape the world of branding. Consumers create identity
from the most prosaic items. Take the humble stapler. In the movie

Office
Space, a peculiar character named Milton was unusually fond of his red sta

pler.

269

After the movie achieved cult status, real-world demand for red

staplers spiked. Swingline, the leading U . S . manufacturer of staplers, then
started production on red staplers. It had never produced a bright red stapler
210
The experience transformed not just the demand for red staplers,

before.

but Swingline's entire marketing strategy:
Now, with all the passion of a convert, Swingline says it has learned how
to target younger office-product customers-it calls them "expressive con
sumers"-with bright-green ergonomic designs and red, white, and blue
paper clips. But the company insists its changes were long in the works.
"Most people have had a Swingline on their desk, looking at the name
every day, year after year," [Swingline's parent's vice president Bill] Car
271
vell says. "People will do a lot to protect their Swingline."

Now suppose Swingline proposed a company policy banning the use of
efficiency consultants. It would find little support for the policy in the aca
demic literature on labor economics or industrial organization. Economists
would scratch their heads. And the lawyer charged with the task of drafting
272
From a branding standpoint,

the policy would be unlikely to get the gag.

however, the policy would make perfect sense.

manuscript, on file with author), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=SS8222; Mary W. Sullivan, Slot
ting Allowances and the Market for New Products, 40 J.L. & EcoN. 461 , 463 (1997) (arguing that
slotting allowances are consistent with competitive behavior).
267.

Trader Joe's, supra note 26S.

268. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc. Annual Report (Form 10-K/A), at SS (Mar. 7, 200S), available
at http://www.wholefoodsmarket.com/investor/1 0K-Q/2004_1 0KA.pdf. What is not clear from these
examples, however, is whether the unusual deal structures are especially costly. Whole Foods and
Trader Joe's, for example, rely heavily on store brands ("private label brands"); giving up slotting
fees may not be costing them much at all.
269.

OFFICE SPACE (Twentieth Century Fox 1 999).

270. Geoffrey A. Fowler, Hollywood Ending: Stapler Becomes a Star, WALL ST. J., July 2,
2002, at B l .
27 1 .

Id. (quoting Bill Carvel, vice president of ACCO Brands, Inc.).

272. A subplot of Office Space involves a corporate downsizing conducted by two consult
ants, both named Bob, who are "efficiency experts." OFFICE SPACE, supra note 269.
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